Issues in Population and Bioethics | Page 9

find the two
facets of this principle in Jewish sacred texts: "One is close to oneself"
and "Your city's poor denizens come first (with regards to charity)".
Some moral obligations are universal - thou shalt not kill. They are
related to one's position as a human being. Other moral values and
obligations arise from one's affiliations. Yet, there is a hierarchy of
moral values and obligations. The ones related to one's position as a
human being are, actually, the weakest.
They are overruled by moral values and obligations related to one's
affiliations. The imperative "thou shalt not kill (another human being)"
is easily over-ruled by the moral obligation to kill for one's country.
The imperative "thou shalt not steal" is superseded by one's moral
obligation to spy for one's nation.
This leads to another startling conclusion:
There is no such thing as a self-consistent moral system. Moral values
and obligations often contradict each other and almost always conflict
with universal moral values and obligations.
In the examples above, killing (for one's country) and stealing (for one's

nation) are moral obligations. Yet, they contradict the universal moral
value of the sanctity of life and the universal moral obligation not to
kill. Far from being a fundamental and immutable principle - the right
to life, it would seem, is merely a convenient implement in the hands of
society.
The Aborted Contract And the Right to Life
By: Dr. Sam Vaknin
The issue of abortion is emotionally loaded and this often makes for
poor, not thoroughly thought out arguments. The questions: "Is
abortion immoral" and "Is abortion a murder" are often confused. The
pregnancy (and the resulting fetus) are discussed in terms normally
reserved to natural catastrophes (force majeure). At times, the embryo
is compared to cancer, a thief, or an invader: after all, they are both
growths, clusters of cells. The difference, of course, is that no one
contracts cancer willingly (except, to some extent, smokers --but, then
they gamble, not contract).
When a woman engages in voluntary sex, does not use contraceptives
and gets pregnant - one can say that she signed a contract with her fetus.
A contract entails the demonstrated existence of a reasonably (and
reasonable) free will. If the fulfillment of the obligations in a contract
between individuals could be life-threatening - it is fair and safe to
assume that no rational free will was involved. No reasonable person
would sign or enter such a contract with another person (though most
people would sign such contracts with society).
Judith Jarvis Thomson argued convincingly ("A Defence of Abortion")
that pregnancies that are the result of forced sex (rape being a special
case) or which are life threatening should or could, morally, be
terminated. Using the transactional language: the contract was not
entered to willingly or reasonably and, therefore, is null and void. Any
actions which are intended to terminate it and to annul its consequences
should be legally and morally permissible.
The same goes for a contract which was entered into against the
express will of one of the parties and despite all the reasonable
measures that the unwilling party adopted to prevent it. If a mother uses
contraceptives in a manner intended to prevent pregnancy, it is as good
as saying: " I do not want to sign this contract, I am doing my
reasonable best not to sign it, if it is signed - it is contrary to my

express will". There is little legal (or moral) doubt that such a contract
should be voided.
Much more serious problems arise when we study the other party to
these implicit agreements: the embryo. To start with, it lacks
consciousness (in the sense that is needed for signing an enforceable
and valid contract). Can a contract be valid even if one of the
"signatories" lacks this sine qua non trait? In the absence of
consciousness, there is little point in talking about free will (or rights
which depend on sentience). So, is the contract not a contract at all?
Does it not reflect the intentions of the parties?
The answer is in the negative. The contract between a mother and her
fetus is derived from the larger Social Contract. Society - through its
apparatuses - stands for the embryo the same way that it represents
minors, the mentally retarded, and the insane. Society steps in - and has
the recognized right and moral obligation to do so - whenever the
powers of the parties to a contract (implicit or explicit) are not balanced.
It protects small citizens from big monopolies, the physically weak
from the thug, the tiny opposition from the mighty administration, the
barely surviving radio station from the claws of the devouring state
mechanism. It also has the right and obligation to intervene, intercede
and represent the unconscious: this