Issues in Population and Bioethics | Page 6

about cloning which involves denuding an
unfertilized egg of its nucleus. Is there life in an egg or a sperm cell?
That something exists, does not necessarily imply that it harbors life.
Sand exists and it is inanimate. But what about things that exist and
have the potential to develop life? No one disputes the existence of
eggs and sperms - or their capacity to grow alive.
Is the potential to be alive a legitimate source of rights? Does the egg
have any rights, or, at the very least, the right to be brought to life (the
right to become or to be) and thus to acquire rights? The much
trumpeted right to acquire life pertains to an entity which exists but is
not alive - an egg. It is, therefore, an unprecedented kind of right. Had
such a right existed, it would have implied an obligation or duty to give
life to the unborn and the not yet conceived.
Clearly, life manifests, at the earliest, when an egg and a sperm unite at
the moment of fertilization. Life is not a potential - it is a process

triggered by an event. An unfertilized egg is neither a process - nor an
event. It does not even possess the potential to become alive unless and
until it is fertilized.
The potential to become alive is not the ontological equivalent of
actually being alive. A potential life cannot give rise to rights and
obligations. The transition from potential to being is not trivial, nor is it
automatic, or inevitable, or independent of context. Atoms of various
elements have the potential to become an egg (or, for that matter, a
human being) - yet no one would claim that they ARE an egg (or a
human being), or that they should be treated as such (i.e., with the same
rights and obligations).
The Right to be Born
While the right to be brought to life deals with potentials - the right to
be born deals with actualities. When one or two adults voluntarily
cause an egg to be fertilized by a sperm cell with the explicit intent and
purpose of creating another life - the right to be born crystallizes. The
voluntary and premeditated action of said adults amounts to a contract
with the embryo - or rather, with society which stands in for the
embryo.
Henceforth, the embryo acquires the entire panoply of human rights:
the right to be born, to be fed, sheltered, to be emotionally nurtured, to
get an education, and so on.
But what if the fertilization was either involuntary (rape) or
unintentional ("accidental" pregnancy)?
Is the embryo's successful acquisition of rights dependent upon the
nature of the conception? We deny criminals their loot as "fruits of the
poisoned tree". Why not deny an embryo his life if it is the outcome of
a crime?
The conventional response - that the embryo did not commit the crime
or conspire in it - is inadequate. We would deny the poisoned fruits of
crime to innocent bystanders as well. Would we allow a passerby to
freely spend cash thrown out of an escape vehicle following a robbery?
Even if we agree that the embryo has a right to be kept alive - this right
cannot be held against his violated mother. It cannot oblige her to
harbor this patently unwanted embryo. If it could survive outside the
womb, this would have solved the moral dilemma. But it is dubious - to
say the least - that it has a right to go on using the mother's body, or

resources, or to burden her in any way in order to sustain its own life.
The Right to Have One's Life Maintained
This leads to a more general quandary. To what extent can one use
other people's bodies, their property, their time, their resources and to
deprive them of pleasure, comfort, material possessions, income, or any
other thing - in order to maintain one's life?
Even if it were possible in reality, it is indefensible to maintain that I
have a right to sustain, improve, or prolong my life at another's expense.
I cannot demand - though I can morally expect - even a trivial and
minimal sacrifice from another in order to prolong my life. I have no
right to do so.
Of course, the existence of an implicit, let alone explicit, contract
between myself and another party would change the picture. The right
to demand sacrifices commensurate with the provisions of the contract
would then crystallize and create corresponding duties and obligations.
No embryo has a right to sustain its life, maintain, or prolong it at its
mother's expense. This is true regardless of how insignificant the
sacrifice required of her is.
Yet, by knowingly and intentionally conceiving the embryo, the mother