Issues in Ethics | Page 6

to all living things (and to appropriately
programmed machines). Not so the catalytic effects of imminent death.
These are uniquely human. The appreciation of the fleeting translates
into aesthetics, the uniqueness of our ephemeral life breeds morality,
and the scarcity of time gives rise to ambition and creativity.
In an infinite life, everything materializes at one time or another, so the
concept of choice is spurious. The realization of our finiteness forces us
to choose among alternatives. This act of selection is predicated upon
the existence of "free will". Animals and machines are thought to be
devoid of choice, slaves to their genetic or human programming.
Yet, all these answers to the question: "What does it mean to be
human" - are lacking.
The set of attributes we designate as human is subject to profound
alteration. Drugs, neuroscience, introspection, and experience all cause
irreversible changes in these traits and characteristics. The
accumulation of these changes can lead, in principle, to the emergence
of new properties, or to the abolition of old ones.
Animals and machines are not supposed to possess free will or exercise
it. What, then, about fusions of machines and humans (bionics)? At
which point does a human turn into a machine? And why should we
assume that free will ceases to exist at that - rather arbitrary - point?
Introspection - the ability to construct self-referential and recursive
models of the world - is supposed to be a uniquely human quality.
What about introspective machines? Surely, say the critics, such
machines are PROGRAMMED to introspect, as opposed to humans.
To qualify as introspection, it must be WILLED, they continue. Yet, if

introspection is willed - WHO wills it? Self-willed introspection leads
to infinite regression and formal logical paradoxes.
Moreover, the notion - if not the formal concept - of "human" rests on
many hidden assumptions and conventions.
Political correctness notwithstanding - why presume that men and
women (or different races) are identically human? Aristotle thought
they were not. A lot separates males from females - genetically (both
genotype and phenotype) and environmentally (culturally). What is
common to these two sub-species that makes them both "human"?
Can we conceive of a human without body (i.e., a Platonian Form, or
soul)? Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas think not. A soul has no existence
separate from the body. A machine-supported energy field with mental
states similar to ours today - would it be considered human? What
about someone in a state of coma - is he or she (or it) fully human?
Is a new born baby human - or, at least, fully human - and, if so, in
which sense? What about a future human race - whose features would
be unrecognizable to us? Machine-based intelligence - would it be
thought of as human? If yes, when would it be considered human?
In all these deliberations, we may be confusing "human" with "person".
The former is a private case of the latter. Locke's person is a moral
agent, a being responsible for its actions. It is constituted by the
continuity of its mental states accessible to introspection.
Locke's is a functional definition. It readily accommodates non-human
persons (machines, energy matrices) if the functional conditions are
satisfied. Thus, an android which meets the prescribed requirements is
more human than a brain dead person.
Descartes' objection that one cannot specify conditions of singularity
and identity over time for disembodied souls is right only if we assume
that such "souls" possess no energy. A bodiless intelligent energy
matrix which maintains its form and identity over time is conceivable.
Certain AI and genetic software programs already do it.
Strawson is Cartesian and Kantian in his definition of a "person" as a
"primitive". Both the corporeal predicates and those pertaining to
mental states apply equally, simultaneously, and inseparably to all the
individuals of that type of entity. Human beings are one such entity.
Some, like Wiggins, limit the list of possible persons to animals - but
this is far from rigorously necessary and is unduly restrictive.

The truth is probably in a synthesis:
A person is any type of fundamental and irreducible entity whose
typical physical individuals (i.e., members) are capable of continuously
experiencing a range of states of consciousness and permanently having
a list of psychological attributes.
This definition allows for non-animal persons and recognizes the
personhood of a brain damaged human ("capable of experiencing"). It
also incorporates Locke's view of humans as possessing an ontological
status similar to "clubs" or "nations" - their personal identity consists of
a variety of interconnected psychological continuities.
And Then There Were Too Many
By: Sam Vaknin
The latest census in Ukraine revealed an apocalyptic drop of 10% in its
population - from 52.5 million a decade ago to a mere 47.5 million last
year. Demographers predict a precipitous decline