Issues in Ethics | Page 4

and obligations.
In the examples above, killing (for one's country) and stealing (for one's

nation) are moral obligations, the outcomes of the application of
derivative moral values. Yet, they contradict the universal moral value
of the sanctity of life and the universal moral obligation not to kill.
Nature, Aesthetics, Pleasure, and Ethics
By: Dr. Sam Vaknin

The distinction often made between emotions and judgements gives
rise to a host of conflicting accounts of morality. Yet, in the same way
that the distinction "observer-observed" is false, so is the distinction
between emotions and judgements. Emotions contain judgements and
judgements are formed by both emotions and the ratio. Emotions are
responses to sensa (see "The Manifold of Sense") and inevitably
incorporate judgements (and beliefs) about those sensa. Some of these
judgements are inherent (the outcome of biological evolution), others
cultural, some unconscious, others conscious, and the result of personal
experience. Judgements, on the other hand, are not compartmentalized.
They vigorously interact with our emotions as they form.
The source of this artificial distinction is the confusion between moral
and natural laws.
We differentiate among four kinds of "right" and "good".
THE NATURAL GOOD
There is "right" in the mathematical, physical, or pragmatic sense. It is
"right" to do something in a certain way. In other words, it is viable,
practical, functional, it coheres with the world. Similarly, we say that it
is "good" to do the "right" thing and that we "ought to" do it. It is the
kind of "right" and "good" that compel us to act because we "ought to".
If we adopt a different course, if we neglect, omit, or refuse to act in the
"right" and "good" way, as we "ought to" - we are punished. Nature
herself penalizes such violations. The immutable laws of nature are the
source of the "rightness" and "goodness" of these courses of action. We
are compelled to adopt them - because we have no other CHOICE. If
we construct a bridge in the "right" and "good" way, as we "ought to" -
it will survive. Otherwise, the laws of nature will make it collapse and,
thus, punish us. We have no choice in the matter. The laws of nature
constrain our moral principles as well.
THE MORAL GOOD
This lack of choice stands in stark contrast to the "good" and "right" of

morality. The laws of morality cannot be compared to the laws of
nature - nor are they variants or derivatives thereof. The laws of nature
leave us no choice. The laws of morality rely on our choice.
Yet, the identical vocabulary and syntax we successfully employ in
both cases (the pragmatic and the moral) - "right action", "good", and
"ought to" - surely signify a deep and hidden connection between our
dictated reactions to the laws of nature and our chosen reactions to the
laws of morality (i.e., our reactions to the laws of Man or God)?
Perhaps the principles and rules of morality ARE laws of nature - but
with choice added? Modern physics incorporates deterministic theories
(Newton's, Einstein's) - and theories involving probability and choice
(Quantum Mechanics and its interpretations, especially the Copenhagen
interpretation). Why can't we conceive of moral laws as private cases
(involving choice, judgements, beliefs, and emotions) of natural laws?
THE HEDONISTIC GOOD
If so, how can we account for the third, hedonistic, variant of "good",
"right", and "ought to"? To live the "good" life may mean to maximize
one's utility (i.e., happiness, or pleasure) - but not necessarily to
maximize overall utility. In other words, living the good life is not
always a moral pursuit (if we apply to it Utilitarian or Consequentialist
yardsticks). Yet, here, too, we use the same syntax and vocabulary. We
say that we want to live the "good" life and to do so, there is a "right
action", which we "ought to" pursue. Is hedonism a private case of the
Laws of Nature as well? This would be going too far. Is it a private
case of the rules or principles of Morality? It could be - but need not be.
Still, the principle of utility has place in every cogent description of
morality.
THE AESTHETIC GOOD
A fourth kind of "good" is of the aesthetic brand. The language of
aesthetic judgement is identical to the languages of physics, morality,
and hedonism. Aesthetic values sound strikingly like moral ones and
both resemble, structurally, the laws of nature. We say that beauty is
"right" (symmetric, etc.), that we "ought to" maximize beauty - and this
leads to the right action. Replace "beauty" with "good" in any aesthetic
statement - and one gets a moral statement. Moral, natural, aesthetic,
and hedonistic statements are all mutually convertible. Moreover, an
aesthetic experience often leads to moral action.

AN INTERACTIVE FRAMEWORK
It is safe to say