Issues in Ethics | Page 2

(dependent on epoch, place, and culture).
Since knowing is a factive attitude, the truth it relates to is the
contingently true nature of moral propositions.
Morality relates objects to moral propositions and it is a mental state
(for every p, having a moral mental relation to p is a mental state).
Adhering to p entails believing p (involves the mental state of belief).
In other words, one cannot adhere without believing. Being in a moral
mental state is both necessary and sufficient for adhering to p. Since no
"truth" is involved - there is no non-mental component of adhering to p.
Adhering to p is a conjunction with each of the conjuncts (believing p
and knowing p) a necessary condition - and the conjunction is
necessary and sufficient for adhering to p.
One doesn't always know if one adheres to p. Many moral rules are
generated "on the fly", as a reaction to circumstances and moral
dilemmas. It is possible to adhere to p falsely (and behave differently

when faced with the harsh test of reality). A sceptic would say that for
any moral proposition p - one is in the position to know that one doesn't
believe p. Admittedly, it is possible for a moral agent to adhere to p
without being in the position to know that one adheres to p, as we
illustrated above. One can also fail to adhere to p without knowing that
one fails to adhere to p. As Williamson says "transparency (to be in the
position to know one's mental state) is false". Naturally, one knows
one's mental state better than one knows other people's. There is an
observational asymmetry involved. We have non-observational
(privileged) access to our mental state and observational access to other
people's mental states. Thus, we can say that we know our morality
non-observationally (directly) - while we are only able to observe other
people's morality.
One believes moral propositions and knows moral propositions.
Whether the belief itself is rational or not, is debatable. But the moral
mental state strongly imitates rational belief (which relies on reasoning).
In other words, the moral mental state masquerades as a factive attitude,
though it is not. The confusion arises from the normative nature of
knowing and being rational.
Normative elements exist in belief attributions, too, but, for some
reason, are considered "outside the realm of belief". Belief, for instance,
entails the grasping of mental content, its rational processing and
manipulation, defeasible reaction to new information.
We will not go here into the distinction offered by Williamson between
"believing truly" (not a mental state, according to him) and "believing".
Suffice it to say that adhering to p is a mental state, metaphysically
speaking - and that "adheres to p" is a (complex or secondary) mental
concept. The structure of adheres to p is such that the non-mental
concepts are the content clause of the attitude ascription and, thus do
not render the concept thus expressed non-mental: adheres to (right and
wrong, evidence, goals, or results).
Williamson's Mental State Operator calculus is applied.
Origin is essential when we strive to fully understand the relations
between adhering that p and other moral concepts (right, wrong,
justified, etc.). To be in the moral state requires the adoption of specific
paths, causes, and behaviour modes. Moral justification and moral
judgement are such paths.

Knowing, Believing and their Conjunction
We said above that:
"Adhering to p is a conjunction with each of the conjuncts (believing p
and knowing p) a necessary condition - and the conjunction is
necessary and sufficient for adhering to p."
Williamson suggests that one believes p if and only if one has an
attitude to proposition p indiscriminable from knowing p. Another idea
is that to believe p is to treat p as if one knew p. Thus, knowing is
central to believing though by no means does it account for the entire
spectrum of belief (example: someone who chooses to believe in God
even though he doesn't know if God exists). Knowledge does determine
what is and is not appropriate to believe, though ("standard of
appropriateness"). Evidence helps justify belief.
But knowing as a mental state is possible without having a concept of
knowing. One can treat propositions in the same way one treats
propositions that one knows - even if one lacks concept of knowing. It
is possible (and practical) to rely on a proposition as a premise if one
has a factive propositional attitude to it. In other words, to treat the
proposition as though it is known and then to believe in it.
As Williamson says, "believing is a kind of a botched knowing".
Knowledge is the aim of belief, its goal.
Affiliation and Morality
By: Dr. Sam Vaknin
Also Read:
Morality as a Mental State
Nature, Aesthetics, Pleasure, and Ethics