International Copyright | Page 4

copyright, your petitioner cannot conscientiously or comfortably apply for redress to the law whilst it sanctions universal piracy hereafter.
"That your petitioner hath two children, who look up to him, not only as the author of the 'Comic Annual,' but as the author of their being. That the effect of the law as regards an author is virtually to disinherit his next of kin, and cut him off with a book instead of a shilling.
"That your petitioner is very willing to write for posterity on the lowest terms, and would not object to the long credit; but that, when his heir shall apply for payment to posterity, he will be referred back to antiquity.
"That, as a man's hairs belong to his head, so his head should belong to his heirs; whereas, on the contrary, your petitioner hath ascertained, by a nice calculation, that one of his principal copyrights will expire on the same day that his only son should come of age. The very law of nature protests against an unnatural law which compels an author to write for anybody's posterity except his own.
"Finally, whereas it has been urged, 'if an author writes for posterity, let him look to posterity for his reward,' your petitioner adopts that very argument, and on its very principle prays for the adoption of the bill introduced by Mr. Sergeant Talfourd, seeing that by the present arrangement posterity is bound to pay everybody or anybody but the true creditor."
In France perpetual copyright was guaranteed from very early times. The Ordinances of Moulines of 1556, the Declaration of Charles IX. in 1571, and the letters-patent of Henry III. constituted the ancient legislation on the subject, but the sovereign had a right to refuse the guarantee whenever he thought desirable. In 1761 the Council of State continued to a grandson of La Fontaine the privilege that his grandfather possessed, on condition, however, that he should not assign it to a bookseller. The Revolution of 1789 modified this regime, and now copyright is guaranteed to authors and their widows during their lives, to their children, for twenty years; and if they leave no children, to their heirs for ten years only. According to French law, a French subject does not injure his copyright by publishing his work first in a foreign country. No matter where the publication takes place, copyright forthwith accrues in France on his behalf, and on the necessary deposit being effected, its infringement may be proceeded against in a French court. Moreover, a foreigner publishing in France will enjoy the same copyright as a native, and this whether he has previously published in his own or in any other country or not. In Germany and in Austria copyright continues for the authors life and for thirty years after his death. The longest term of copyright is conceded in Italy, where it endures for the life of the author and forty years, with a second term of forty years, during which last any one can publish the work upon paying the royalty to the author or his assigns. The shortest term of copyright exists in Greece, where it endures for but fifteen years from publication.
In the United States, by the law of 1831, the term is for twenty-eight years, with the right of renewal to the author, his wife or his children, for fourteen years further. The renewal must be recorded within six months before the expiration of the first term of twenty-eight years.
Drone says:
"In the United States the authorities have been divided not less than in England regarding the origin and nature of literary property. Indeed, the doctrines there prevalent have ruled our courts. In 1834, in the case of Wheaton vs. Peters, the same question came before the Supreme Court, that had been decided by the Court of King's Bench in 1769, and by the House of Lords in 1774--namely, whether copyright in a published work existed by common law; and if so, whether it had been taken away by statute.
"The court held that the law had been settled in England to the effect that the author had no right in a published work excepting that secured by statute; that there was no common law of the United States, and that the common law as to copyright had not been adopted in Pennsylvania, in which State the cause of this action arose; and that by the copyright statute of 1790, Congress did not affirm an existing right, but created one. The opinion, which was delivered by Justice McLean, was concurred in by three of the judges, and dissented from by two, Justices Thompson and Baldwin, who defended the positions and recalled the arguments of Lord Mansfield and Sir William Blackstone. Justice Baldwin said: 'Protection is the avowed and real purpose of the act of 1790.