Indian speeches (1907-1909) | Page 4

to a question of what may seem a Party or personal
character, with which it is not in the least my intention to deal. This is
what the Ameer said on 10th April--
"The officers of the Government of India never said a word on political
matters, they kept their promise. But as to myself, whenever and
wherever I found an opportunity, I spoke indirectly on several matters
which concerned the interests of my country and nation. The other side
never took undue advantage of it, and never discussed with me on those
points which I mentioned. His Excellency's invitation (Lord Minto's) to
me was in such a proper form, that I had no objection to accept it. The
invitation which he sent was worded in quite a different form from that
of the invitation which I received on the occasion of the Delhi Durbar.
In the circumstances I had determined to undergo all risks (at the time
of the Delhi Durbar) and, if necessary, to sacrifice all my possessions

and my own life, but not to accept such an invitation as was sent to me
for coming to join the Delhi Durbar."
These thing are far too serious for me or any of us to indulge in
controversy upon, but it is a satisfaction to be able to point out to the
House that the policy we instructed the Governor-General to follow,
has so far worked extremely well.
I will go back to the Army. Last year when I referred to this subject, I
told the House that it would be my object to remove any defects that I
and those who advise me might discover in the Army system, and more
especially, of course, in the schemes of Lord Kitchener. Since then,
with the assistance of two very important Committees, well qualified
by expert military knowledge, I came to the conclusion that an
improved equipment was required. Hon. Gentlemen may think that my
opinion alone would not be worth much; but, after all, civilians have
got to decide these questions, and, provided that they arm themselves
with the expert knowledge of military authorities, it is rightly their
voice that settles the matter. Certain changes were necessary in the
allocation of units in order to enable the troops to be better trained, and
therefore our final conclusion was that the special military expenditure
shown in the financial statement must go on for some years more. But
the House will see that we have arranged to cut down the rate of the
annual grant, and we have taken care--and this, I think, ought to be set
down to our credit--that every estimate for every item included in the
programme shall be submitted to vigilant scrutiny here as well as in
India. I have no prepossession in favour of military expenditure, but the
pressure of facts, the pressure of the situation, the possibilities of
contingencies that may arise, seem obviously to make it impossible for
any Government or any Minister to acquiesce in the risks on the Indian
frontier. We have to consider not only our position with respect to
foreign Powers on the Indian frontier, but the exceedingly complex
questions that arise in connection with the turbulent border tribes. All
these things make it impossible--I say nothing about internal
conditions--for any Government or any Minister with a sense of
responsibility to cancel or to deal with the military programme in any
high-handed or cavalier way.
Next I come to what, I am sure, is first in the minds of most Members
of the House--the political and social condition of India. Lord Minto

became Viceroy, I think, in November, 1905, and the present
Government succeeded to power in the first week of December. Now
much of the criticism that I have seen on the attitude of His Majesty's
Government and the Viceroy, leaves out of account the fact that we did
not come quite into a haven of serenity and peace. Very fierce
monsoons had broken out on the Olympian heights at Simla, in the
camps, and in the Councils at Downing Street. This was the inheritance
into which we came--rather a formidable inheritance for which I do not,
this afternoon, attempt to distribute the responsibility. Still, when we
came into power, our policy was necessarily guided by the conditions
under which the case had been left. Our policy was to compose the
singular conditions of controversy and confusion by which we were
faced. In the famous Army case we happily succeeded. But in Eastern
Bengal, for a time, we did not succeed. When I see newspaper articles
beginning with the preamble that the problem of India is altogether
outside party questions, I well know from experience that this is too
often apt to be the forerunner of a regular party attack. It