Indian Frontier Policy | Page 9

as to our respective spheres and
relations with the tribes and nations with whom we were now both in
contact, and he went on to welcome the civilising effect of Russian
government over the wild tribes of the Steppes, and pointed out that if
Russia were assured of our loyal feeling in these matters, she would
have no jealousy in respect of our alliance with the Afghans.
The Secretary of State (Sir Stafford Northcote) replied 'that the
conquests which Russia had made, and apparently is still making, in
Central Asia, appear to be the natural result of the circumstances in
which she finds herself placed, and to afford no ground whatever for
representations indicative of suspicion or alarm on the part of this
country.' It is a great misfortune that such sensible, conciliatory views
did not continue to guide our policy in the events which a few years
later led us into the second great war in Afghanistan.
Shere Ali did not inherit the great qualities of his father, and was also
somewhat discontented that we had not abetted his cause during the
internal troubles in Afghanistan. However, in 1869 he met Lord Mayo
at Umballa, and after careful discussion it was agreed that we should
abstain from sending British officers across the frontier and from
interfering in Afghan affairs; that our desire was that a strong, friendly,
and independent Government should be established in that country. It
was further decided to give Shere Ali considerable pecuniary assistance,
and presents of arms from time to time. The Ameer, while gratified at
these results, wished us also to give a dynastic pledge as to his lineal
descendants, which, however, was not acceded to. In 1873 Lord
Northbrook was Viceroy of India, and a further conference took place
at Simla with the Ameer's Prime Minister, chiefly as to the northern
Afghan frontier in Badakshan and Wakkan, which were at the time
somewhat uncertain, and a matter of dispute with Russia.
This somewhat delicate question was, however, settled in a friendly
manner by Lord Granville, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
Prince Gortschakoff's final despatch to him on the subject was as

follows: [Footnote: Central Asia, 1873--c. 699.] 'The divergence which
existed in our views was with regard to the frontiers assigned to the
dominion of Shere Ali. The English Government includes within them
Badakshan and Wakkan, which according to our views enjoyed a
certain independence. Considering the difficulty experienced in
establishing the facts in all their details in those distant parts;
considering the greater facilities which the British Government
possesses for collecting precise detail, and above all considering our
wish not to give to this question of detail greater importance than is due
to it, we do not refuse to accept the boundary line laid down by
England. We are the more inclined to this act of courtesy as the English
Government engages to use all its influence with Shere Ali in order to
induce him to maintain a peaceful attitude, as well as to insist on his
giving up all measures of aggression or further conquest. This influence
is indisputable. It is based, not only on the material and moral
ascendency of England, but also on the subsidies for which Shere Ali is
indebted to her. Such being the case, we see in this assurance a real
guarantee for the maintenance of peace.'
Prince Gortschakoff admitted more than once that the Emperor of
Russia looked upon Afghanistan as completely outside the sphere of
Russian influence, and within that of ours; at the same time, claiming
similar independence for Russia in Central Asia.
During the next few years, subsequent to the Simla conference, Shere
Ali, though he had received considerable assistance from us, both in
money and arms, was not altogether satisfied, and one or two incidents
occurred during that period which gave him umbrage. Lord Northbrook,
the Viceroy in 1875, was not unaware of the somewhat cold and
capricious spirit of the Ameer, but in writing to London he pointed out
that Shere Ali's situation was difficult, not only from the risk of
revolution at home, but also of attack from abroad, but that on the
whole he was to be relied on.
A change, however, was coming over the scene, and our policy
reverted from conciliation to compulsion. It was a critical period in the
history of frontier policy, and demands careful consideration.

It must not be forgotten that although amongst those best qualified to
judge the majority had long been opposed to advance and conquest in
territories beyond our North-West frontier, and entertained but little
fear of Russian aggressive power, still there were others--men of long
experience, who had filled high positions in India--who held different
views; and it is probable that not only successive British Governments,
but the public