Independent Bohemia | Page 7

of this hegemony the Austrian Germans and Magyars, whose ambitions are identical with those of Germany, were entirely dependent on Berlin. Thus Austria-Hungary became inevitably Germany's partner and vanguard in the south-east. Finally, the present war was started by the Germans and Magyars with the object of achieving the ambitious plans preached and expounded by Pan-German writers for years past. The Germans wanted at all costs to become the masters of Central Europe, to build an empire from Berlin to Bagdad, and finally to strike for world domination.
2. In this turn of events Magyar influence played a greater part than might be thought. Already in 1848 Kossuth defined the Hungarian foreign policy as follows:--
"The Magyar nation is bound to maintain the most cordial relations with the free German nation and help it in safeguarding Western civilisation."
And while the Hungarian Slavs were prohibited from attending the Pan-Slav Congress held in Prague in 1848, the Magyars sent two delegates to Frankfurt in order to give practical expression to the above Magyar policy.
The value of Hungary for the Pan-German plans has been expressed by Friedrich List who, in 1862, dreamt of "a powerful oriental German-Magyar Empire," and declared:
"The way towards the realisation of this plan runs through Hungary, and while without Hungary we can do nothing, with her aid we can do everything. Hungary is for Germany the clue to Turkey and the Near East, and at the same time a bulwark against a superior power from the north."
The Magyars realised from the beginning the importance of an understanding between themselves and Prussia, and they directed their foreign policy accordingly. The setting up of dualism in 1867, which finally established the German-Magyar hegemony in Austria-Hungary in the interests of Prussia, was the work of two Magyars--Julius Andrassy and Francis Deak, who took advantage of Austria's defeat at Sadova to further their interests. In 1870, when Vienna contemplated revenge against Prussia, the Magyars again intervened in favour of Prussia. When questioned as to Hungary's attitude, Andrassy, then Premier, declared in the Hungarian Parliament that under no circumstances would he allow any action against Prussia, and exerted all his influence in Vienna to that effect. It was also due mainly to Magyar influence that all attempts of the Czechs to weaken German influence in Austria were frustrated. Francis Joseph always promised to be crowned King of Bohemia when he wished to placate the Czechs in times of stress for Austria: in 1861, 1865, 1870 and 1871. But he never carried out his promises. In this he was guided not only by considerations of dynastic interest, but also by the advice of the Magyars.
But the most decisive and fateful exercise of Magyar influence upon Austria's foreign policy occurred in 1879, when the Austro-German Alliance was finally concluded. This was equally the work of Bismarck, who spared the defeated Austria in order to make an ally of her, and of a Magyar--Count Andrassy--who from 1871 to 1879 was the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister. It was this Magyar help which made Bismarck utter words of gratitude and declare in 1883:
"Our political judgment leads us to the conviction that German and Magyar interests are inseparable."
It is true that there always was a Magyar opposition against Austria (though never against Prussia). But this opposition was used as a weapon to extort concessions from Austria. At the bottom of their hearts, however, the Austrian Germans were always at one with the Magyars in their common desire to oppress the Slavs. And the responsibility of Count Tisza for the present world catastrophe is just as great as that of the Kaiser himself.
3. The Czechs saw clearly the progress of events. Bismarck was well aware of the importance of Bohemia, for he declared that the master of Bohemia would become the master of Europe. He did not desire to annex any Austrian territory, since he knew that sooner or later Germany would swallow the whole of Austria, as she has done in this war. Indeed, at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, Bismarck did not conceal his intention of using Austria-Hungary in Germany's interests. At the bottom of his heart he was at one with the radical Pan-German writers, like Lagarde, Treitschke, Mommsen, Naumann and others, who openly declared that the Slavs should be subjugated and the Czechs, as the most courageous and therefore the most dangerous of them, crushed.
The Slavs always bitterly opposed the encroachments of Germanism, and saw in it their chief enemy. The Czech leader Palacky rejected the invitation to Frankfurt in 1848 and summoned a Slav Congress to Prague. It is true that Palacky at that time dreamt of an Austria just to all her nations. He advocated a strong Austria as a federation of nations to counterbalance Pan-Germanism. Yet at the same time Palacky has proved through his history