Independent Bohemia | Page 8

and work that Bohemia has full right to independence. He was well aware that a federalistic and just Austria would have to grant independence to the Czecho-Slovaks. But later on he gave up his illusions about the possibility of a just Austria, when he saw that she abandoned the Slavs entirely to German-Magyar hegemony, and declared that Bohemia existed before Austria and would also exist after her. In 1866 he wrote:
"I myself now give up all hope of a long preservation of the Austrian Empire; not because it is not desirable or has no mission to fulfil, but because it allowed the Germans and Magyars to grasp the reins of government and to found in it their racial tyranny."
Exasperated by the pact of dualism which the Czechs never recognised, Palacky went to Moscow and on his return declared:
"I have already said that I do not cherish any hopes of the preservation of Austria, especially since the Germans and Magyars made it the home of their racial despotism; the question therefore as to what will happen to the Slavs hitherto living in Austria is not without significance. Without attempting to prophesy future events which for a mortal man it is difficult to foreshadow, I may say from my inner conviction that the Czechs as a nation, if they fell under the subjection of either Russia or Prussia, would never rest contented. It would never fade from their memory that according to right or justice they should be ruled by themselves, that is by their own government and by their own sovereign. They would regard the Prussians as their deadly enemies on account of their germanising rage. But as to the Russians, the Czechs would regard them as their racial brothers and friends; they would not become their faithful subjects, but their true allies and, if need be, vanguards in Europe."
Moreover, modern Czech politicians always clearly saw what the Germans were aiming at. Dr. Kram��r, for instance, foresaw the present situation with remarkable perspicacity. In the Revue de Paris for February, 1899, he wrote on "The Future of Austria," declaring that her subject nationalities should be on guard lest she should become a vassal of Germany and a bridge for German expansion into Asia:
"The Austrian Germans wish to see Austria subordinated to German policy, and with the help of a subordinated Austria, the sphere of German political and economic activity would extend from Hamburg to Asia Minor."
Similarly also he warned Great Britain in the National Review for October, 1902, that if Pan-German plans were realised,
"Austria would become an appanage of Germany as regards international relations, and the policy of Europe would be obliged to reckon, not with a free and independent Austria, but, owing to Austria's unconditional self-surrender, with a mighty, almost invincible Germany.... The Pan-Germans are right, the Czechs are an arrow in the side of Germany, and such they wish to and must and will remain. Their firm and unchangeable hope is that they will succeed in making of themselves an impenetrable breakwater. They hope for no foreign help; they neither wish for it nor ask for it. They have only one desire, namely, that non-German Europe may also at last show that it understands the meaning of the Bohemian question."
In 1906 Dr. Kram��r wrote again in detail on the plans of German domination in Central Europe, in the Adriatic and in the Near East. In a book on Czech policy he declared that to prevent the realisation of these plans was the vital interest of the Czech nation: "A far-seeing Austrian policy should see in the Czech nation the safeguard of the independence of the State." And then followed the famous passage which formed part of the "evidence" quoted against him during his trial for high treason:
"If Austria-Hungary continues her internal policy by centralising in order to be better able to germanise and preserve the German character of the State, if she does not resist all efforts for the creation of a customs and economic union with Germany, the Pan-German movement will prove fatal for her. To preserve and maintain a state the sole ambition of which was to be a second German State after Germany, would be superfluous not only for the European Powers, but also for the non-German nations of Europe. _And if, therefore, a conflict should break out between the German and the non-German world and the definite fate of Austria should be at stake, the conflict would surely not end with the preservation of Austria_."
And on November 10, 1911, he admitted that his former hopes for the destruction of the Austro-German Alliance and a rapprochement between Austria and Russia proved to be in vain:
"... _I had an aim in life and a leading idea. The events of the annexation crisis have proved calamitous for the