In the World War | Page 2

the Emperor Francis Joseph to
induce him to secede from the Alliance and join the Powers encircling
Germany. It is likewise known that the Emperor Francis Joseph
rejected the proposal, and that this decided the fate of Austria-Hungary.
From that day we were no longer the independent masters of our
destiny. Our fate was linked to that of Germany; without being
conscious of it, we were carried away by Germany through the
Alliance.
I do not mean absolutely to deny that, during the years preceding war,
it would still have been possible for Germany to avert it if she had
eradicated from European public opinion all suspicion respecting her
dream of world dominion, for far be it from me to assert that the
Western Powers were eager for war. On the contrary, it is my firm
conviction that the leading statesmen of the Western Powers viewed the
situation as such, that if they did not succeed in defeating Germany, the
unavoidable result would be a German world domination. I mention the

Western Powers, for I believe that a strong military party in Russia,
which had as chief the Grand Duke Nicholas, thought otherwise, and
began this war with satisfaction. The terrible tragedy of this, the
greatest misfortune of all time--and such is this war--lies in the fact that
nobody responsible willed it; it arose out of a situation created first by a
Serbian assassin and then by some Russian generals keen on war, while
the events that ensued took the monarchs and statesmen completely by
surprise. The Entente group of Powers is as much to blame as we are.
As regards this, however, a very considerable difference must be made
between the enemy states. In 1914 neither France nor England desired
war. France had always cherished the thought of revenge, but, judging
from all indications, she had no intention of fighting in 1914; but, on
the contrary--as she did fifty years ago--left the decisive moment for
entering into war to the future. The war came quite as a surprise to
France. England, in spite of her anti-German policy, wished to remain
neutral and only changed her mind owing to the invasion of Belgium.
In Russia the Tsar did not know what he wanted, and the military party
urged unceasingly for war. As a matter of fact, Russia began military
operations without a declaration of war.
The states that followed after--Italy and Roumania--entered into the
war for purposes of conquest, Roumania in particular. Italy also, of
course, but owing to her geographical position, and being exposed to
pressure from England, she was less able to remain neutral than
Roumania.
But the war would never have broken out had it not been that the
growing suspicion of the Entente as to Germany's plans had already
brought the situation to boiling point. The spirit and demeanour of
Germany, the speeches of the Emperor William, the behaviour of the
Prussians throughout the world--whether in the case of a general at
Potsdam or a commis voyageur out in East Africa--these Prussian
manners inflicting themselves upon the world, the ceaseless boasting of
their own power and the clattering of swords, roused throughout the
whole world a feeling of antipathy and alarm and effected that moral
coalition against Germany which in this war has found such terribly
practical expression. On the other hand, I am fairly convinced that

German, or rather Prussian tendencies have been misunderstood by the
world, and that the leading German statesmen never had any intention
of acquiring world dominion. They wished to retain Germany's place in
the sun, her rank among the first Powers of the world; it was
undoubtedly her right, but the real and alleged continuous German
provocation and the ever-growing fears of the Entente in consequence
created just that fatal competition in armaments and that coalition
policy which burst like a terrible thunderstorm into war.
It was only on the basis of these European fears that the French plans of
revenge developed into action. England would never have drawn the
sword merely for the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine; but the French plan
of revenge was admirably adapted to suit the policy inaugurated by
King Edward, which was derived not from French but from English
motives.
Out of this dread of attack and defence arose that mad fever for
armaments which was characteristic of pre-war times. The race to
possess more soldiers and more guns than one's neighbour was carried
to an absurd extreme. The armaments which the nations had to bear had
become so cumbersome as to be unbearable, and for long it had been
obvious to everyone that the course entered upon could no longer be
pursued, and that two possibilities alone remained--either a voluntary
and general disarmament, or war.
A slight attempt at the first alternative was made in 1912 through