Impressions of South Africa | Page 9

secure reform in the best way,
viz., by the action of public spirit and enlightenment within the
legislature. It would furnish a basis for union between the immigrants
and the friends of good government among the burghers themselves,
and so conduce to the future peace of the community. There was,
however, one material condition, a condition which might prove to be
an objection, affecting the resort to it. Since the electoral franchise was
a matter entirely within the competence of the South African Republic,

Britain must, if she desired to abide by the principles of international
law, confine herself to recommendation and advice. She had no right to
demand, no right to insist that her advice should be followed. She could
not compel compliance by force, nor even by the threat of using force.
In other words, a refusal to enlarge the franchise would not furnish any
casus belli.
This course having been adopted, the negotiations entered on a new
phase with the Conference at Bloemfontein, where President Kruger
met the British High Commissioner. Such a direct interchange of views
between the leading representatives of two Powers may often be
expedient, because it helps the parties to get sooner to close quarters
with the substantial points of difference, and so facilitates a
compromise. But its utility depends on two conditions. Either the basis
of discussion should be arranged beforehand, leaving only minor
matters to be adjusted, or else the proceedings should be informal and
private. At Bloemfontein neither condition existed. No basis had been
previously arranged. The Conference was formal and (although the
press were not admitted) virtually public, each party speaking before
the world, each watched and acclaimed by its supporters over the
country. The eyes of South Africa were fixed on Bloemfontein, so that
when the Conference came to its unfruitful end, the two parties were
practically further off than before, and their failure to agree accentuated
the bitterness both of the Transvaal Boers and of the English party in
the Colonies. To the more extreme men among the latter this result was
welcome. There was already a war party in the Colony, and voices
clamorous for war were heard in the English press. Both then and
afterwards every check to the negotiations evoked a burst of joy from
organs of opinion at home and in the Cape, whose articles were
unfortunately telegraphed to Pretoria. Worse still, the cry of "Avenge
Majuba" was frequently heard in the Colonies, and sometimes even in
England.
The story of the negotiations which followed during the months of July,
August and September, cannot be told fully here, because it is long and
intricate, nor summarized, because the fairness of any summary not
supported by citations would be disputed. There are, however, some

phenomena in the process of drifting towards war which may be
concisely noticed.
One of these is that the contending parties were at one moment all but
agreed. The Transvaal Government offered to give the suffrage after
five years residence (which was what had been asked by the High
Commissioner at Bloemfontein) coupled with certain conditions, which
had little importance, and were afterwards so explained as to have even
less. This was, from their point of view, a great concession, one to
which they expected opposition from the more conservative section of
their own burghers. The British negotiators, though they have since
stated that they meant substantially to accept this proposal, sent a reply
whose treatment of the conditions was understood as a refusal, and
which appeared to raise further questions; and when the Transvaal went
back to a previous offer, which had previously been held to furnish a
basis for agreement, the British Government declined to recur to that
basis, as being no longer tenable after the later offer. The Boers, who
had expected (from informal communications) that the five years offer
would be readily accepted, seem to have thought that there was no
longer any chance of a settlement, because fresh demands would follow
each concession. They ought, however, to have persevered with their
five years offer, which they could the more easily have done because
they had tacitly dropped the unsustainable claim to be a "sovereign and
independent state," and expressed themselves ready to abide by the
Convention of 1884. The British Government, on its part, would seem
to have thought, when the five years offer was withdrawn because the
conditions attached to it were not accepted, that the Boers had been
trifling with them, and resolved to exact all they demanded, even
though less than all would have represented a diplomatic victory. Thus
a conflict was precipitated which a more cautious and tactful policy
might have avoided.
The controversy continued through three months to turn on the question
of the franchise, nor were any demands for the redress