Impressions of South Africa | Page 7

do the like, neither the Home
Government in the one case, nor the Federal Government in the other
would have any right to interfere. All therefore that Britain could do
was to call the attention of the South African Republic in a friendly
way to the harm which the restriction of the franchise was causing, and
point out that to enlarge it might remove the risk of a collision over
other matters which did fall within the scope of British intervention.

We are therefore, on a review of the whole position, led to conclude
that Britain was justified in requiring the Transvaal Government to
redress the grievances (other than the limited suffrage) which were
complained of. Whether she would be justified in proceeding to enforce
by arms compliance with her demand, would of course depend upon
several things, upon the extent to which the existence of the grievances
could be disproved, upon the spirit in which the Transvaal met the
demand, upon the amount of concessions offered or amendment
promised. But before the British Government entered on a course
which might end in war, if the Transvaal should prove intractable, there
were some considerations which it was bound seriously to weigh.
One of these was the time for entering on a controversy. The Jameson
invasion was only three years old; and the passions it evoked had not
subsided. In it British officers, and troops flying the British flag, if not
Britain herself, had been wrongdoers. Suspicions of British good faith
were known to pervade the Boer mind, and would give an ominous
colour to every demand coming from Britain. The lapse of time might
diminish these suspicions, and give to negotiations a better prospect of
success. Time, moreover, was likely to work against the existing
system of the Transvaal. Bad governments carry the seeds of their own
dissolution. The reforming party among the Transvaal burghers would
gain strength, and try to throw off the existing régime. The President
was an old man, whose retirement from power could not be long
delayed; and no successor would be able to hold together as he had
done the party of resistance to reform. In the strife of factions that
would follow his retirement reform was certain to have a far better
chance than it could have had since 1895. In fact, to put it shortly, all
the natural forces were working for the Uitlanders, and would either
open the way for their admission to a share in power, or else make the
task of Britain easier by giving her less united and therefore less
formidable antagonists. These considerations counselled a
postponement of the attempt to bring matters to a crisis.
In the second place the British Government had to remember the
importance of carrying the opinion of the Dutch in Cape Colony, and,
as far as possible, even of the Orange Free State, with them in any

action they might take. It has been pointed out how before December,
1895, that opinion blamed the Transvaal Government for its unfriendly
treatment of the immigrants. The Dutch of both communities had
nothing to gain and something to lose by the maladministration of the
Transvaal, so that they were nowise disposed to support it in refusing
reforms. The only thing that would make them rally to it would be a
menace to its independence, regarding which they, and especially the
Free State people, were extremely sensitive. Plainly, therefore, unless
the colonial Dutch were to be incensed and the Free State men turned to
enemies, such a menace was to be avoided.
Finally, the British authorities were bound to make sure, not only that
they had an adequate casus belli which they could present to their own
people and to the world, but also that the gain to be expected from
immediately redressing the grievances of the Uitlander outweighed the
permanent evils war would entail. Even where, according to the usage
of nations, a just cause for war exists, even where victory in the war
may be reckoned on, the harm to be expected may be greater than the
fruits of victory. Here the harm was evident. The cost of equipping a
large force and transporting it across many thousand miles of sea was
the smallest part of the harm. The alienation of more than half the
population of Cape Colony, the destruction of a peaceful and
prosperous Republic with which Britain had no quarrel, the
responsibility for governing the Transvaal when conquered, with its old
inhabitants bitterly hostile, these were evils so grave, that the benefits
to be secured to the Uitlanders might well seem small in comparison. A
nation is, no doubt, bound to protect its subjects. But it could hardly be
said that the hardships of this group of subjects, which did not prevent
others from