Impressions of South Africa | Page 4

suits, by a resolution having
the force of law. This was a defect due, not to any desire to do wrong,
but to the inexperience of those who had originally framed the
Constitution, and to the want of legal knowledge and skill among those
who had worked it, and was aggravated by the fact that the legislature
consisted of one Chamber only, which was naturally led to legislate by
way of resolution (besluit) because the process of passing laws in the
stricter sense of the term involved a tedious and cumbrous process of
bringing them to the knowledge of the people throughout the country.
Upon this point there arose a dispute with the Chief Justice which led
to the dismissal of that official and one of his colleagues, a dispute
which could not be explained here without entering upon technical
details. There is no reason to think that the President's action was

prompted by any wish to give the legislature the means of wronging
individuals, nor has evidence been produced to show that its powers
have been in fact (at least to any material extent) so used. The matter
cannot be fairly judged without considering the peculiar character of
the Transvaal Constitution, for which the President is nowise to blame,
and the statements often made in this country that the subjection of the
judiciary to the legislature destroys the security of property are much
exaggerated, for property has been, in fact, secure. It was, nevertheless,
an error not to try to retain a man so much respected as the Chief
Justice, and not to fulfil the promise given to Sir Henry de Villiers
(who had been invoked as mediator) that the judiciary should be placed
in a more assured position.
The idea which seems to have filled the President's mind was that force
was the only remedy. The Republic was, he thought, sure to be again
attacked from within or from without; and the essential thing was to
strengthen its military resources for defence, while retaining political
power in the hands of the burghers. Accordingly, the fortifications
already begun at Pretoria were pushed on, a strong fort was erected to
command Johannesburg, and munitions of war were imported in very
large quantities, while the Uitlanders were debarred from possessing
arms. Such precautions were natural. Any government which had been
nearly overthrown, and expected another attack, would have done the
like. But these measures of course incensed the Uitlanders, who saw
that another insurrection would have less chance of success than the
last, and resented the inferiority implied in disarmament, as Israel
resented the similar policy pursued by the Philistine princes. The
capitalists also, an important factor by their wealth and by their power
of influencing opinion in Europe, were angry and restless, because the
prospect of securing reforms which would reduce the cost of working
the gold reefs became more remote.
This was the condition of things in the two Republics and the British
Colonies when the diplomatic controversy between the Imperial
Government and the South African Republic, which had been going on
ever since 1895, passed in the early summer of 1899 into a more acute
phase. The beginning of that phase coincided, as it so happened, with

the expiry of the period during which the leaders of the Johannesburg
rising of 1895 had promised to abstain from interference in politics, and
the incident out of which it grew was the presentation to the Queen (in
March 1899), through the High Commissioner, of a petition from a
large number of British residents on the Witwatersrand complaining of
the position in which they found themselves. The situation soon
became one of great tension, owing to the growing passion of the
English in South Africa and the growing suspicion on the part of the
Transvaal Boers. But before we speak of the negotiations, let us
consider for a moment what was the position of the two parties to the
controversy.
The position of the Transvaal Government, although (as will presently
appear) it had some measure of legal strength, was, if regarded from the
point of view of actual facts, logically indefensible and materially
dangerous. It was not, indeed, the fault of that Government that the
richest goldfield in the world had been discovered in its territory, nor
would it have been possible for the Boers, whatever they might have
wished, to prevent the mines from being worked and the miners from
streaming in. But the course they took was condemned from the first to
failure. They desired to have the benefit of the gold-mines while yet
retaining their old ways of life, not seeing that the two things were
incompatible. Moreover, they--or rather the President and his
advisers--committed the fatal mistake of trying to maintain a
government which was at the same time