Hume | Page 6

world; and if we could be certain
by intuition, or by the aid of revelation, that it is wrong for society, as a
corporate body, to do anything for the improvement of its members and,
thereby, indirectly support the twelve judges, no objection could be
raised to it.
Unfortunately the existence of rival or inimical nations furnishes "kings
and parliaments, fleets and armies," with a good deal of occupation
beyond the support of the twelve judges; and, though the proposition
that the State has no business to meddle with anything but the
administration of justice, seems sometimes to be regarded as an axiom,
it can hardly be said to be intuitively certain, inasmuch as a great many
people absolutely repudiate it; while, as yet, the attempt to give it the
authority of a revelation has not been made.
As Hume says with profound truth in the fourth essay, On the First
Principles of Government:--
"As force is always on the side of the governed, the governors have
nothing to support them but opinion. It is, therefore, on opinion only
that government is founded; and this maxim extends to the most

despotic and most military governments, as well as to the most free and
the most popular."--(III. 31.)
But if the whole fabric of social organisation rests on opinion, it may
surely be fairly argued that, in the interests of self-preservation, if for
no better reason, society has a right to see that the means of forming
just opinions are placed within the reach of every one of its members;
and, therefore, that due provision for education, at any rate, is a right
and, indeed, a duty, of the state.
The three opinions upon which all government, or the authority of the
few over the many, is founded, says Hume, are public interest, right to
power, and right to property. No government can permanently exist,
unless the majority of the citizens, who are the ultimate depositary of
Force, are convinced that it serves the general interest, that it has lawful
authority, and that it respects individual rights:--
"A government may endure for several ages, though the balance of
power and the balance of property do not coincide.... But where the
original constitution allows any share of power, though small, to an
order of men who possess a large share of property, it is easy for them
gradually to stretch their authority, and bring the balance of power to
coincide with that of property. This has been the case with the House of
Commons in England."--(III. 34.)
Hume then points out that, in his time, the authority of the Commons
was by no means equivalent to the property and power it represented,
and proceeds:--
"Were the members obliged to receive instructions from their
constituents, like the Dutch deputies, this would entirely alter the case;
and if such immense power and riches as those of all the Commons of
Great Britain, were brought into the scale, it is not easy to conceive that
the crown could either influence that multitude of people, or withstand
that balance of property. It is true, the crown has great influence over
the collective body in the elections of members; but were this influence,
which at present is only exerted once in seven years, to be employed in
bringing over the people to every vote, it would soon be wasted, and no

skill, popularity, or revenue could support it. I must, therefore, be of
opinion that an alteration in this particular would introduce a total
alteration in our government, would soon reduce it to a pure republic;
and, perhaps, to a republic of no inconvenient form."--(III. 35.)
Viewed by the light of subsequent events, this is surely a very
remarkable example of political sagacity. The members of the House of
Commons are not yet delegates; but, with the widening of the suffrage
and the rapidly increasing tendency to drill and organise the electorate,
and to exact definite pledges from candidates, they are rapidly
becoming, if not delegates, at least attorneys for committees of electors.
The same causes are constantly tending to exclude men, who combine a
keen sense of self-respect with large intellectual capacity, from a
position in which the one is as constantly offended, as the other is
neutralised. Notwithstanding the attempt of George the Third to
resuscitate the royal authority, Hume's foresight has been so completely
justified that no one now dreams of the crown exerting the slightest
influence upon elections.
In the seventh essay, Hume raises a very interesting discussion as to the
probable ultimate result of the forces which were at work in the British
Constitution in the first part of the eighteenth century:--
"There has been a sudden and sensible change in the opinions of men,
within these last fifty years, by the progress of