History of the United Netherlands, 1605-07 | Page 7

work of the armies was over for many a
long year. Freedom and independence were secured. A deed or two,
never to be forgotten by Netherland hearts, was yet to be done on the
ocean, before the long and intricate negotiations for peace should begin,
and the weary people permit themselves to rejoice; but the prize was
already won.
Meantime, the conduct of Prince Maurice in these last days of the
campaign was the subject of biting censure by friend and foe. The
military fame of Spinola throughout Europe grew apace; and the fame

of his great rival seemed to shrink in the same proportion.
Henry of France was especially indignant at what he considered the
shortcomings of the republic and of its chief. Already, before the close
of the summer, the agent Aerssens had written from Paris that his
Majesty was very much displeased with Spinola's prosperity, ascribing
it to the want of good councils on the part of the States' Government
that so fine an army should lie idle so long, without making an attempt
to relieve the beleaguered places, so that Spinola felt assured of taking
anything as soon as he made his appearance. "Your Mightinesses
cannot believe," continued the agent, "what a trophy is made by the
Spanish ministers out of these little exploits, and they have so much
address at this court, that if such things continue they may produce still
greater results."
In December he wrote that the king was so malcontent concerning the
siege of Groll as to make it impossible to answer him with arguments,
that he openly expressed regret at not having employed the money lent
to the States upon strengthening his own frontiers, so distrustful was he
of their capacity for managing affairs, and that he mentioned with
disgust statements received from his ambassador at Brussels and from
the Duc de Rohan, to the effect that Spinola had between five and six
thousand men only at the relief of Groll, against twelve thousand in the
stadholder's army.
The motives of the deeds and the omissions of the prince at this
supreme moment must be pondered with great caution. The
States-General had doubtless been inclined for vigorous movements,
and Olden-Barneveld, with some of his colleagues, had visited the
camp late in September to urge the relief of Rheinberg. Maurice was in
daily correspondence with the Government, and regularly demanded
their advice, by which, on many former occasions, he had bound
himself, even when it was in conflict with his own better judgment.
But throughout this campaign, the responsibility was entirely, almost
ostentatiously, thrown by the States-General upon their commander-in-
chief, and, as already indicated, their preparations in the spring and
early summer had been entirely inadequate. Should he lose the army
with which he had so quietly but completely checked Spinola in all his
really important moves during the summer and autumn, he might
despair of putting another very soon into the field. That his force in that

November week before Groll was numerically far superior to the
enemy is certain, but he had lost confidence in his cavalry since their
bad behaviour at Mulheim the previous year, and a very large
proportion of his infantry was on the sick-list at the moment of
Spinola's approach. "Lest the continual bad weather should entirely
consume the army," he said, "we are resolved, within a day or two after
we have removed the sick who are here in great numbers, to break up,
unless the enemy should give us occasion to make some attempt upon
him."
Maurice was the servant of a small republic, contending single-handed
against an empire still considered the most formidable power in the
world. His cue was not necessarily to fight on all occasions; for delay
often fights better than an army against a foreign invader. When a battle
and a victory were absolutely necessary we have seen the magnificent
calmness which at Nieuport secured triumph under the shadow of death.
Had he accepted Spinola's challenge in November, he would probably
have defeated him and have taken Groll. He might not, however, have
annihilated his adversary, who, even when worsted, would perhaps
have effected his escape. The city was of small value to the republic.
The principal advantage of a victory would have been increased
military renown for himself. Viewed in this light, there is something
almost sublime in the phlegmatic and perfectly republican composure
with which he disdained laurels, easily enough, as it would stem, to
have been acquired, and denied his soldiers the bloodshed and the
suffering for which they were clamouring.
And yet, after thoroughly weighing and measuring all these
circumstances, it is natural to regret that he did not on that occasion rise
upon Spinola and smite him to the earth. The Lord had delivered him
into