History of the United Netherlands, 1604-05 | Page 3

had elapsed since its capture, the
republic had not ceased to deplore that disaster. Obviously if the
present expedition could end in the restoration of Sluy's to its rightful
owners, it would be a remarkable success, even if Ostend should fall.
Sluy's and its adjacent domains formed a natural portion of the Zeeland
archipelago, the geographical counterpart of Flushing. With both
branches of the stately Scheld in its control, the republic would
command the coast, and might even dispense with Ostend, which, in

the judgment of Maurice, was an isolated and therefore not a desirable
military possession. The States- General were of a different opinion.
They much desired to obtain Sluy's, but they would not listen to the
abandonment of Ostend. It was expected of the stadholder, therefore,
that he should seize the one and protect the other. The task was a
difficult one. A less mathematical brain than that of Maurice of Nassau
would have reeled at the problem to be solved. To master such a plexus
of canals, estuaries, and dykes, of passages through swamps, of fords at
low water which were obliterated by flood- tide; to take possession of a
series of redoubts built on the only firm points of land, with nothing but
quaking morass over which to manoeuvre troops or plant batteries
against them, would be a difficult study, even upon paper. To
accomplish it in the presence of a vigilant and anxious foe seemed
bewildering enough.
At first it was the intention of the stadholder, disappointed at learning
the occupation of the Swint, to content himself with fortifying Cadzand,
in view of future operations at some more favourable moment? So
meagre a result would certainly not have given great satisfaction to the
States, nor added much to the military reputation of Maurice. While he
hesitated between plunging without a clue into the watery maze around
him, and returning discomfited from the expedition on which such high
hopes had been built, a Flemish boor presented himself. He offered to
guide the army around the east and south of Sluy's, and to point out
passages where it would be possible to cross the waters, which, through
the care of Spinola, now seemed to forbid access to the place. Maurice
lingered no longer. On the 28th April, led by the friendly boor, he
advanced towards Oostburg. Next morning a small force of the enemy's
infantry and cavalry was seen, showing that there must be foothold in
that direction. He sent out a few companies to skirmish with those
troops, who fled after a very brief action, and, in flying, showed their
pursuers the road. Maurice marched in force, straight through the
waters, on the track of the retreating foe. They endeavoured to rally at
the fort of Coxie, which stood upon and commanded a dyke, but the
republicans were too quick for them, and drove them out of the place."
The stadholder, thus obtaining an unexpected passage into Flanders,
conceived strong hopes of success, despite the broken nature of the
ground. Continuing to feel his way cautiously through the wilderness of

quagmire, he soon came upon a very formidable obstacle. The
well-built and well-equipped redoubt of St. Catharine rose frowning
before him, overshadowing his path, and completely prohibiting all
further progress. Plainly it would be necessary to reduce this work at
once, unless he were willing to abandon his enterprise. He sent back to
Cadzand for artillery, but it was flood- tide, the waters were out, and it
was not till late in the afternoon that nine pieces arrived. The stadholder
ordered a cannonade, less with the hope of producing an impression by
such inadequate means on so strong a work, than with the intention of
showing the enemy that he had brought field-guns with him, and was
not merely on an accidental foray. At the same time, having learned
that the garrison, which was commanded by Trivulzio, was composed
of only a few regular troops, and a large force of guerillas, he gave
notice that such combatants were not entitled to quarter, and that if
captured they would be all put to the sword. The reply to this threat was
not evacuation but defiance. Especially a volunteer ensign mounted
upon a rampart, and danced about, waving his flag gaily in the face of
the assailants. Maurice bitterly remarked to his staff that such a man
alone was enough to hold the fort. As it was obvious that the place
would require a siege in form, and that it would be almost impossible to
establish batteries upon that quaking soil, where there was no dry land
for cavalry or artillery to move, Maurice ordered the nine guns to be
carried back to Cadzand that night, betaking himself, much
disappointed, in the same direction." Yet it so happened that the