History of the United Netherlands, 1600-09 | Page 8

midsummer's night. The dilemma was as grave a one as
commander-in- chief had ever to solve in a few hours. A portentous
change had come over the prospects of the commonwealth since the
arrival of these despatches. But a few hours before, and never had its
destiny seemed so secure, its attitude more imposing. The little republic,
which Spain had been endeavouring forty years long to subjugate, had
already swept every Spanish soldier out of its territory, had repeatedly
carried fire and sword into Spain itself, and even into its distant
dependencies, and at that moment--after effecting in a masterly manner

the landing of a great army in the very face of the man who claimed to
be sovereign of all the Netherlands, and after marching at ease through
the heart of his territory--was preparing a movement, with every
prospect of success, which should render the hold of that sovereign on
any portion of Netherland soil as uncertain and shifting as the sands on
which the States army was now encamped.
The son of the proscribed and murdered rebel stood at the head of as
powerful and well-disciplined an army as had ever been drawn up in
line of battle on that blood-stained soil. The daughter of the man who
had so long oppressed the provinces might soon be a fugitive from the
land over which she had so recently been endowed with perpetual
sovereignty. And now in an instant these visions were fading like a
mirage.
The archduke, whom poverty and mutiny were to render powerless
against invasion, was following close up upon the heels of the
triumphant army of the stadholder. A decision was immediately
necessary. The siege of Nieuport was over before it had begun. Surprise
had failed, assault for the moment was impossible, the manner how
best to confront the advancing foe the only question.
Vere advised that the whole army should at once be concentrated and
led without delay against the archduke before he should make further
progress. The advice involved an outrageous impossibility, and it
seems incredible that it could have been given in good faith; still more
amazing that its rejection by Maurice should have been bitterly
censured. Two-thirds of the army lay on the other side of the harbour,
and it was high water at about three o'clock. While they were
deliberating, the sea was rising, and, so soon as daybreak should make
any evolutions possible, they would be utterly prohibited during several
hours by the inexorable tide. More time would be consumed by the
attempt to construct temporary bridges (for of course little progress had
been made in the stone bridge hardly begun) or to make use of boats
than in waiting for the falling of the water, and, should the enemy make
his appearance while they were engaged in such confusing efforts, the
army would be hopelessly lost.
Maurice, against the express advice of Vere, decided to send his cousin
Ernest, with the main portion of the force established on the right bank
of the harbour, in search of the archduke, for the purpose of holding

him in check long enough to enable the rest of the army to cross the
water when the tide should serve. The enemy, it was now clear, would
advance by precisely the path over which the States' army had marched
that morning. Ernest was accordingly instructed to move with the
greatest expedition in order to seize the bridge at Leffingen before the
archduke should reach the deep, dangerous, and marshy river, over
which it was the sole passage to the downs. Two thousand infantry,
being the Scotch regiment of Edmonds and the Zeelanders of Van der
Noot, four squadrons of Dutch cavalry, and two pieces of artillery
composed the force with which Ernest set forth at a little before dawn
on his hazardous but heroic enterprise.
With a handful of troops he was to make head against an army, and the
youth accepted the task in the cheerful spirit of self-sacrifice which
characterized his house. Marching as rapidly as the difficult ground
would permit, he had the disappointment, on approaching the fatal
point at about eight o'clock, to see the bridge at Leffingen in the
possession of the enemy. Maurice had sent off a messenger early that
morning with a letter marked post haste (cito, cito) to Ostend ordering
up some four hundred cavalry-men then stationed in that city under
Piron and Bruges, to move up to the support of Ernest, and to destroy
the bridge and dams at Leffingen before the enemy should arrive. That
letter, which might have been so effective, was delivered, as it
subsequently appeared, exactly ten days after it was written. The States,
of their own authority, had endeavoured to send out those riders
towards the scene of action, but it