History of the Expedition to Russia | Page 8

them into insurrection, he cut his way
through several French corps, which he defeated, to Elsfleth, where he
found an English vessel waiting to receive and to convey him to
England, with the laurels he had acquired.]
This focus spread its fires and gained new partizans every day; it
attacked the power of Napoleon in the opinion of all Germany,
extended itself into Italy, and threatened its complete overthrow. It was
already easy to see that, if circumstances became unfavourable to us,
there would be no want of men to take advantage of them. In 1809,
even before the disaster of Esslingen, the first who had ventured to
raise the standard of independence against Napoleon were Prussians.
He sent them to the galleys; so important did he feel it to smother that
cry of revolt, which seemed to echo that of the Spaniards, and might
become general.
Independently of all these causes of hatred, the position of Prussia,
between France and Russia, compelled Napoleon to remain her master;
he could not reign there but by force--he could not be strong there but
by her weakness.
He ruined the country, although he must have known well that poverty
creates audacity; that the hope of gain becomes the moving principle of
those who have nothing more to lose; and finally, that in leaving them
nothing but the sword, he in a manner obliged them to turn it against
himself. In consequence, on the approach of the year 1812, and of the
terrible struggle which it was to produce, Frederick, uneasy and tired of
his subservient position, was determined to extricate himself from it,
either by an alliance or by war. In March, 1811, he offered himself to
Napoleon as an auxiliary in the expedition which he was preparing. In
the month of May, and again in the month of August, he repeated that
offer; and as he received no satisfactory answer, he declared, that as the
great military movements which surrounded, crossed, or drained his
kingdom, were such as to excite his apprehension that his entire

destruction was meditated, "he took up arms, because circumstances
imperiously called upon him to do so, deeming it far preferable to die
sword in hand than to fall with disgrace."
It was said at the same time, that Frederick secretly offered to
Alexander to give him possession of Graudentz, and his magazines, and
to put himself at the head of his insurgent subjects, if the Russian army
should advance into Silesia. If the same authorities are to be believed,
Alexander received this proposition, very favourably. He immediately
sent to Bagration and Wittgenstein sealed marching orders. They were
instructed not to open them until they received another letter from their
sovereign, which he never wrote, having changed his resolution. A
variety of causes might have dictated that change; 1st, a wish not to be
the first to commence so great a war, and his anxiety to have divine
justice and the opinion of mankind on his side, by not appearing the
aggressor; 2d, that Frederick, becoming less uneasy as to the plans of
Napoleon, had resolved to follow his fortunes. It is probable, after all,
that the noble sentiments which Alexander expressed in his reply to the
king were his only motives: we are assured that he wrote to him, "That
in a war which might begin by reverses, and in which perseverance was
required, he only felt courageous for himself, and that the misfortunes
of an ally might shake his resolution; that it would grieve him to chain
Prussia to his fortune if it was bad; that if it was good he should always
be ready to share it with her, whatever line of conduct necessity might
oblige her to pursue."
These details have been certified to us by a witness, although an
inferior one. However, whether this counsel proceeded from the
generosity or the policy of Alexander, or Frederick was determined
solely by the necessity of the case, it is certain that it was high time for
him to come to a decision; for in February, 1812, these
communications with Alexander, if there were such, or the hope of
obtaining better terms from France having made him hesitate in
replying to the definitive propositions of Napoleon, the latter,
becoming impatient, sent additional forces to Dantzic, and made
Davoust enter Pomerania. His orders for this invasion of a Swedish
province were repeated and pressing; they were grounded on the illicit

commerce carried on by the Pomeranians with the English, and
subsequently on the necessity of compelling Prussia to accede to his
terms. The Prince of Eckmühl even received orders to hold himself in
readiness to take immediate possession of that kingdom, and to seize
the person of her sovereign, if within eight days from the date of these