History of the Expedition to Russia | Page 5

March, 1812, she promised France 30,000 men; but she prepared
prudent secret instructions for them. She obtained a vague promise of
an increase of territory, as an indemnity for her share of the expenses of
the war, and the possession of Gallicia was guaranteed to her. She
admitted, however, the future possibility of a cession of part of that
province to the kingdom of Poland; but in exchange for that she would
have received the Illyrian provinces. The sixth article of the secret

treaty establishes that fact.
The success of the war, therefore, in no degree depended on the cession
of Gallicia, or the difficulties arising from the Austrian jealousy of that
possession. Napoleon, consequently, might on his entrance into Wilna,
have publicly proclaimed the liberation of the whole of Poland, instead
of betraying the expectations of her people, astonishing and rendering
them indifferent by expressions of wavering import.
This, however, was one of those prominent points, which in politics as
well as in war are decisive, with which every thing is connected, and
from which nothing ought to have made him swerve. But whether it
was that Napoleon reckoned too much on the ascendancy of his genius,
or the strength of his army, and the weakness of Alexander; or that,
considering what he left behind him, he felt it too dangerous to carry on
so distant a war slowly and methodically; or whether, as we shall
presently be told by himself, he had doubts of the success of his
undertaking; certain it is, that he either neglected, or could not yet
determine to proclaim the liberation of that country whose freedom he
had come to restore.
And yet he had sent an ambassador to her Diet. When this
inconsistency was remarked to him, he replied, that "that nomination
was an act of war, which only bound him during the war, while by his
words he would be bound both in war and peace." Thus it was, that he
made no other reply to the enthusiasm of the Lithuanians than evasive
expressions, at the very time he was following up his attack on
Alexander to the very capital of his empire.
He even neglected to clear the southern Polish provinces of the feeble
hostile armies which kept the patriotism of their inhabitants in check,
and to secure, by strongly organizing their insurrection, a solid basis of
operation. Accustomed to short methods, and to rapid attacks, he
wished to imitate himself, in spite of the difference of places and
circumstances; for such is the weakness of man, that he is always led
by imitation, either of others, or of himself, which in the latter case,
that of great men, is habit; for habit is nothing more than the imitation
of one's self. So true it is, that by their strongest side these

extraordinary men are undone!
The one in question committed himself to the fortune of battles. Having
prepared an army of six hundred and fifty thousand men, he fancied
that that was doing sufficient to secure victory, from which he expected
every thing. Instead of sacrificing every thing to obtain victory, it was
by that he looked to obtain every thing; he made use of it as a means,
when it ought to have been his end. In this manner he made it too
necessary; it was already rather too much so. But he confided so much
of futurity to it, he overloaded it with so much responsibility, that it
became urgent and indispensable to him. Hence his precipitation to get
within reach of it, in order to extricate himself from so critical a
position.
But we must not be too hasty in condemning a genius so great and
universal; we shall shortly hear from himself by what urgent necessity
he was hurried on; and even admitting that the rapidity of his
expedition was only equalled by its rashness, success would have
probably crowned it, if the premature decline of his health had left the
physical constitution of this great man all the vigour which his mind
still retained.

CHAP. II.
As to Prussia, of which Napoleon was completely master, it is not
known whether it was from his uncertainty as to the fate which he
reserved for her, or as to the period at which he should commence the
war, that he refused, in 1811, to contract the alliance which she herself
proposed to him, and of which he dictated the conditions, in 1812.
His aversion to Frederick William was remarkable. Napoleon had been
frequently heard to speak reproachfully of the cabinet of Prussia for its
treaties with the French republic. He said, "It was a desertion of the
cause of kings; that the negotiations of the court of Berlin with the
Directory displayed a timid, selfish, and ignoble policy,