History of the Early Part of the Reign of James the Second | Page 5

rather to have been guarded against by treaty than alleged as
a pretence for breaking off the negotiation? Sad, indeed, will be the
condition of the world if we are never to make peace with an adverse
party whose sincerity we have reason to suspect. Even just grounds for
such suspicions will but too often occur, and when such fail, the
proneness of man to impute evil qualities, as well as evil designs, to his
enemies, will suggest false ones. In the present case the suspicion of
insincerity was, it is true, so just, as to amount to a moral certainty. The
example of the petition of right was a satisfactory proof that the king
made no point of adhering to concessions which he considered as
extorted from him; and a philosophical historian, writing above a
century after the time, can deem the pretended hard usage Charles met
with as a sufficient excuse for his breaking his faith in the first instance,
much more must that prince himself, with all his prejudices and notions
of his divine right, have thought it justifiable to retract concessions,
which to him, no doubt, appeared far more unreasonable than the
petition of right, and which, with much more colour, he might consider
as extorted. These considerations were probably the cause why the
Parliament so long delayed their determination of accepting the king's
offer as a basis for treaty; but, unfortunately, they had delayed so long
that when at last they adopted it they found themselves without power
to carry it into execution. The army having now ceased to be the
servants, had become the masters of the Parliament, and, being entirely
influenced by Cromwell, gave a commencement to what may, properly
speaking, be called a new reign. The subsequent measures, therefore,
the execution of the king, as well as others, are not to be considered as
acts of the Parliament, but of Cromwell; and great and respectable as
are the names of some who sat in the high court, they must be regarded,
in this instance, rather as ministers of that usurper than as acting from

themselves.
The execution of the king, though a far less violent measure than that of
Lord Strafford, is an event of so singular a nature that we cannot
wonder that it should have excited more sensation than any other in the
annals of England. This exemplary act of substantial justice, as it has
been called by some, of enormous wickedness by others, must be
considered in two points of view. First, was it not in itself just and
necessary? Secondly, was the example of it likely to be salutary or
pernicious? In regard to the first of these questions, Mr. Hume, not
perhaps intentionally, makes the best justification of it by saying that
while Charles lived the projected republic could never be secure. But to
justify taking away the life of an individual upon the principle of self-
defence, the danger must be not problematical and remote, but evident
and immediate. The danger in this instance was not of such a nature,
and the imprisonment or even banishment of Charles might have given
to the republic such a degree of security as any government ought to be
content with. It must be confessed, however, on the other aide, that if
the republican government had suffered the king to escape, it would
have been an act of justice and generosity wholly unexampled; and to
have granted him even his life would have been one among the more
rare efforts of virtue. The short interval between the deposal and death
of princes is become proverbial, and though there may be some few
examples on the other side as far as life is concerned, I doubt whether a
single instance can be found where liberty has been granted to a
deposed monarch. Among the modes of destroying persons in such a
situation, there can be little doubt but that that adopted by Cromwell
and his adherents is the least dishonourable. Edward II., Richard II.,
Henry VI., Edward V., had none of them long survived their deposal,
but this was the first instance, in our history at least, where, of such an
act, it could be truly said that it was not done in a corner.
As to the second question, whether the advantage to be derived from
the example was such as to justify an act of such violence, it appears to
me to be a complete solution of it to observe that, with respect to
England (and I know not upon what ground we are to set examples for
other nations; or, in other words, to take the criminal justice of the

world into our hands) it was wholly needless, and therefore
unjustifiable, to set one for kings at a time when