Handbook of Ethical Theory | Page 7

to him, a place beyond the pale of law as
he knew it. [Footnote: See SIR HENRY MAINE, Ancient Law, chapter
iii.] Many centuries have elapsed since pagan philosophers taught the
brotherhood of man, and since Christian divines began to preach it with
passionate fervor. Yet civilized nations today are still seeking to find a
modus vivendi, which may put an end to strife and enable them to live
together. The jus gentium, or its modern equivalent, is, alas! still in its
rudiments.
To obviate misunderstanding at this point, it is well to state that, in
adducing all the above facts, I do not mean to argue that it is abnormal
and an undesirable thing that the scales of justice should, at times, be
weighted in divers ways. I am not maintaining that the distribution of
common good should proceed upon the principle of strict impartiality.

What is possible and is desirable in this field is not something to be
decided off-hand. But the facts suffice to illustrate the truth that the
discrepancies to be found in the codes of different communities can
scarcely be dismissed as unimportant details. They are something far
too significant for that.


CHAPTER III
THE CODES OF THE MORALISTS
7. THE MORALISTS.--If, from the codes, or the more or less vague
bodies of opinion, which have characterized different communities, we
turn to the moralists, we find similar food for thought.
But who are the moralists? Can we put into one class those who preach
a short-sighted selfishness or a calculating egoism and those who urge
upon us the law of love? Those who recommend a contempt of
mankind, and those who inculcate a reverence for humanity? Those
who incline to leave us to our own devices, telling us to listen to
conscience, and those who draw up for us elaborate sets of rules to
guide conduct? The histories of ethics are rather tolerant in herding
together sheep and goats. And not without reason. Those whom they
include have been in a sense the spokesmen of their fellows. Their
words have found an echo in the souls of many. They are concerned
with a rule of life, and their rule of life, such as it is, rests upon some
principle which has impressed men as being not wholly unreasonable.
In taking a glance at what they have to offer us, I shall not go far afield,
and shall exercise a brevity compatible with the purpose of mere
illustration. To the moralists of ancient Greece, and, to a lesser degree,
to those of the Roman Empire, to the Christian teachers who succeeded
to their heritage in the centuries which followed, and to the more or less
independent thinkers who made their appearance after the Reformation,
we can trace our ethical pedigree. For our purpose we need seek no

wider field. Here we may find sufficiently notable contrasts of opinion
to disturb the dogmatic slumber of even an inert mind. The most
cursory glance makes us inclined to accept with some reserve Stephen's
claim that "the difference between different systems is chiefly in the
details and special application of generally admitted principles."
8. EPICUREAN AND STOIC.--Thus, Aristippus of Cyrene advised
men to grasp the pleasure of the moment rather than to await the more
uncertain pleasure of the future; but he also counselled, for prudential
reasons, the avoidance of a conflict with the laws. Such advice takes
cognizance of the self-love of the individual, and is not self-love
reasonable? Nevertheless, such advice might be given by a discouraged
criminal of a reflective turn of mind, on his release from prison, to a
comrade not yet chastened by incarceration. Epicurus praises
temperance and fortitude, but only as measures of prudence. He praises
justice, but only in so far as it enables us to escape harm, and frees us
from that dread of discovery that haunts the steps of the evil-doer. His
more specific maxims, do not fall in love with a woman, become the
father of a family, or, generally, go into politics, smack strongly of the
rule of life recommended to Feuillet's hero, Monsieur de Camors, by
his worldly-wise and cynical father.
Contrast with these men the Stoics, whose rule of life was to follow
Nature, and to eschew the pursuit of pleasure. Man's nature, said
Epictetus, is social; wrongdoing is antisocial; affection is natural.
[Footnote: Discourses, Book I, chapter xxiii--a clever answer to
Epicurus.] Said Marcus Aurelius, it is characteristic of the rational soul
for a man to love his neighbor. The cautious bachelor imbued with
Epicurean principles would find strange and disconcerting the Stoic
position touching citizenship: "My nature is rational and social; and my
city and country, so far as I am Antoninus, is Rome, but so far as I am a
man, it is