Handbook of Ethical Theory | Page 4

of men has ever attempted to live by. If we leave it to our
hearers to drape our naked abstractions with concrete details, each will
set to work in a different way. The method of the composite
photograph seems unprofitable in attempting to solve the problem of
morals.
3. DOGMATIC ASSUMPTION.--There is, however, a second way by
which the variations which characterize different codes may come to be
relegated to a position of relative insignificance. We may assume that
our own code is the ultimate standard by which all others are to be
judged, and we may set down deviations from it to the account of the
ignorance or the perversity of our fellowmen. So regarded, they are
aberrations from the normal, and only true code of conduct; interesting,
perhaps, but little enlightening, for they can have little bearing upon
our conception of what we ought to do.
A presumption against this arbitrary assumption that we have the one
and only desirable code is suggested the unthinking acceptance of the
traditional by those who are lacking in enlightenment and in the
capacity reflection. Is it not significant that a contact with new ways of
thinking has a tendency, at least, to make men broaden their horizon
and to revise some of their views?
In other fields, we hope to attain to a capacity for self-criticism. We
expect to learn from other men. Why should we, in the sphere of morals,
lay claim to the possession of the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
the truth? Why should we refuse to learn from anyone? Such a position
seems unreasoning. It puts moral judgments beyond the pale of
argument and intelligent discussion. It is an assumption of infallibility
little in harmony with the spirit of science. The fact that a given
standard of conduct is in harmony with our traditions, habits of thought,
and emotional responses, does not prove to other men that it is, not one
of a number of accepted codes, but in a quite peculiar sense acceptable,
a thing to put in a class by itself--the class into which each mother puts
her own child, as over against other children.
Moreover, such an unreasoned assumption of superiority must make
one little sympathetic in one's attitude toward the moral life of other

peoples. Into the significance of their social organization, of their
customs, their laws, one can gain no insight. Their hopes, their fears,
their strivings, their successes and their failures, their approval and
disapproval of their fellows, their peace of conscience and their
remorse, must leave us cold and aloof.
It is not profitable for us to assume at the outset that the differences
exhibited in the moral judgments of individuals or of peoples are of
minor significance. They are facts to be dealt with in the light of some
theory. An ethical theory which ignores them must rest upon a narrow
and insecure foundation. It is exposed to assault from many quarters. It
may, in default of better means of defence, be compelled to take refuge
behind the blind wall of dogmatic assertion. On the other hand, a theory
which gives them frank recognition, and strives to exhibit their real
significance in the life of the individual and of the race, may be able to
show lying among them the golden cord of reason which saves them
from the charge of being incoherent facts. It may even lead us back to a
conservatism no longer unreasoning, but rationally defensible and
conscious of its proper limits. The blindly conservative man seems to
be faced with the alternative of stagnation or revolution. The rationally
conservative may regard the development of the moral life as a
Pilgrim's Progress, not without its untoward accidents, but, in spite of
them, a gradual advance toward a desirable goal.


CHAPTER II
THE CODES OF COMMUNITIES
4. THE CODES OF COMMUNITIES: JUSTICE.--In view of the
existing tendency in the average man, and even in some philosophers,
to pass lightly over the diversities exhibited by different codes, it is
well to cast a brief preliminary glance at the content of morals as
accepted, both by communities of men, and by their more reflective
spokesmen, the moralists. Let us first take a look at the codes of

communities.
We have seen that Butler viewed justice, veracity and regard to
common good as virtues accepted among men everywhere. But we may
also see, if we look into his pages, that he neglected to point out that
there may be the widest divergencies in men's notions of what
constitutes justice, veracity and common good. And men differ widely
on the score of the degree of emphasis to be laid upon their observance.
Take justice. Where men possess a code, written or unwritten, that may
properly be called moral, we