Great Riots of New York 1712 to 1873 | Page 5

J.T. Headley
be furnished.
The objections to relying on the military, as we invariably do in case of a large mob, are many. In the first place, it takes the best part of a day to get the troops together, so that a mob, so far as they are concerned, has time not only to waste and destroy for many hours, but increase in strength and audacity. The members of the various regiments are scattered all over the city, engaged in different occupations and employments, and without previous notice being given, it is a long and tedious process to get them to their respective headquarters and in uniform. This wastes much and most valuable time. Besides, they are compelled to reach the mustering place singly or in small groups, and hence liable to be cut off or driven back by the mob, which in most cases would know the place of rendezvous.
In the second place, the members are taken out from the mass of the people, between whom there might be a strong sympathy in some particular outbreak, which would impair their efficiency, and make them hesitate to shoot down their friends and acquaintances.
In the third place, in ordinary peace times, these uniformed regiments are not the steadiest or most reliable troops, as was witnessed in the riots of 1863, as well as in those of the Astor Place in 1849.
They hesitate, or are apt to become hasty or disorganized in a close, confused fight, and driven back. In the commencement of a riot, a defeat of the military gives increased confidence, and indeed, power to a mob, and snakes the sacrifice of life, in the end, far greater.
In the fourth place, clearing the streets does not always dissipate a mob. A whole block of houses may become a fortress, which it is necessary to storm before a permanent victory is gained. Half-disciplined men, unaccustomed, and unskilled to such work, make poor headway with their muskets through narrow halls, up stairways, and through scuttle-holes.
In the fifth place, the military of the city cannot be called away from their work for two or three days, to parade the city, without a heavy expense, and hence the process is a costly one.
In the last place, the firing of these troops at the best is not very judicious, and cannot be discriminating, so that those are shot down often least culpable, and of least influence in the mob--in fact, more lives usually are taken than is necessary.
The simplest, most efficient, and most economical plan would be to select five hundred or more of the most courageous, experienced, and efficient men from the police department, and form them into a separate battalion, and have them drilled in such evolutions, manoeuvres, and modes of attack or defence, as would belong to the work they were set apart to do. A battery might be given them in case of certain emergencies, and a portion carefully trained in its use. At a certain signal of the bell, they should be required to hasten, without a moment's delay, to their head-quarters. A mob could hardly be gathered and commence work before this solid body of disciplined, reliable men would be upon them. These five hundred men would scatter five thousand rioters like chaff before them. It would be more efficient than two entire regiments, even if assembled, and would be worth more than the whole military of the city for the first half day.
Besides, clubs are better than guns. They take no time to load--they are never discharged like muskets, leaving their owners for the time at the mercy of the mob. Their volleys are incessant and perpetual, given as long and fast as strong arms can strike. They are also more discriminating than bullets, hitting the guilty ones first. Moreover, they disable rather than kill--which is just as effectual, and far more desirable. In addition to all this, being trained to one purpose, instructed to one duty, a mob would be their natural enemies, and hence sympathy with them in any cause almost impossible.

CHAPTER II.
THE NEGRO RIOTS OF 1712-1741.
Almost impossible for the present Generation to comprehend its true Character and Effect on the People.--Description of New York at that Time.--The Negro Slaves.--The Negro Riot of 1712.--Description of it.--The Winter of 1741.--Governor's House burned down.--Other Fires.--Suspicion of the People.--Arrest and Imprisonment of the Blacks.--Reward offered for the supposed Conspirators.--Alarm and Flight of the Inhabitants.-- Examination and Confession of Mary Burton.--Peggy, the Newfoundland Beauty, and the Hughson Family.--The Conspiracy.--Executions.--Fast.-- Hughson's Hearing.--Hung in Chains.--The Body, and that of a Negro, left to swing and rot in the Air.--Strange Change in the Appearances of the Bodies.--The People throng to look at them.--Negroes burned at the Stake. --Terrific Spectacle.--Bloody Summer.--Execution of a Catholic Priest.-- Strange Scenes.--Upper Classes accused.--Executions stopped.--Reason of the Panic.
Probably no event of
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