Gallipoli Diary, Volume II | Page 2

in seizing the Key to the opening of the
Narrows--Achi Baba, and had failed through lack of small craft, lack of
water, lack of means of bringing up supplies, lack of our 10 per cent.
reserves to fill casualties. At that crucial moment when we had beaten
the local enemy troops and the enemy reinforcements had not yet come
up, we could not get the men or the stuff quick enough to shore. Still,
we had gained three or four miles and there were spots on the Peninsula
where, to-day, three or four miles would be enough. Also, supposing he
had to run a landing, his (Stopford's) action would take place under
much easier conditions than Hunter-Weston's on April 25th.
First and foremost, in our "beetles" or barges, conveying 500 men
under their own engines, we had an instrument which reduced the
physical effort three quarters. This meant half the battle. When we
made our original landing at Anzac we could only put 1,500 men
ashore, per trip, at a speed of 2-1/2 miles per hour, in open cutters.
Were a Commander to repeat that landing now, he would be able to run

5,000 men ashore, per trip, at a speed of five miles per hour with no
trouble about oars, tows, etc., and with protection against shrapnel and
rifle bullets. As to the actual landing on the beach, that could be
done--we had proved it--in less than one quarter of the time. Each
beetle had a "brow" fixed on to her bows; a thing to be let down like a
drawbridge over which the men could pour ashore by fours; the same
with mules, guns, supplies, they could all be rushed on land as fast as
they could be handled on the beaches. Secondly, we had already been
for some time at work to fix up the wherewithal to meet our chronic
nightmare, the water trouble. Thirdly, the system of bringing up food
and ammunition from the beaches to the firing line had now been
practically worked out into a science at Helles and Anzac where
Stopford would be given a chance of studying it at first hand.
As to place, date, command, and distribution of forces, these were still
being considered; still undetermined; and I could say no more at
present. Braithwaite was away at Helles but, if he would go over to the
General Staff, he would find Aspinall, my G.S. (1), and the Q. Staff
who would give him the hang of our methods and post him in matters
which would be applicable to any date or place.
There was more in this message as taken down by Stopford. After
going into some details of trench warfare, K.'s message went on:--
* * * * *
"It is not the wish of the Cabinet that Sir Ian Hamilton should make
partial attacks. They (the Cabinet) consider it preferable that he should
await the arrival of his reinforcements to make one great effort, which,
if successful, will give them the ridge commanding the Narrows. It is
not intended, however, that Sir Ian should do nothing in the meantime
and if he gets a really good opportunity he is to seize it."
There is something in this reminds me of Kuropatkin's orders to
Stakelberg, yet I am glad to find that our spontaneously generated
scheme jumps with the views of the Cabinet, for, there is only one
"ridge commanding the Narrows" (Kilid Bahr is a plateau), and it is
that ridge we mean to try for by "one great effort."

In my reply I shall merely acknowledge. Sari Bair is my secret; my
Open Sesame to the cave where the forty thieves of the Committee of
Union and Progress have their Headquarters. It makes me uneasy to
think the Cabinet are talking about Sari Bair.
A battle is a swirl of "ifs" and "ands." The Commander who enters
upon it possessed by some just and clear principle is like a sailing ship
entering a typhoon on the right tack. After that he lives from hand to
mouth. How far will wise saws cut ice? How much nearer do you get to
shooting a snipe by being told how not to take your aim? Well thought
out plans and preparations deserve to win; order and punctuality on the
part of subordinates tend to make the reality correspond to the General
Staff conception; surprise, if the Commander can bring it off, is worth
all K. can say of it; the energy and rapidity of the chosen troops will
exploit that surprise for its full value--bar, always, Luck--the Joker; and
Wish to Fight and Will to Win are the surest victory getters in the pack.
The more these factors are examined, the more sure it is that everything
must in the last resort