Gallipoli Diary, Volume I | Page 5

the
North-west coast of the Southern part of the Peninsula, opposite Kilid
Bahr. "But," said K., "half that number of men will do you handsomely;
the Turks are busy elsewhere; I hope you will not have to land at all; if
you do have to land, why then the powerful Fleet at your back will be
the prime factor in your choice of time and place."
I asked K. if he would not move the Admiralty to work a submarine or
two up the Straits at once so as to prevent reinforcements and supplies
coming down by sea from Constantinople. By now the Turks must be
on the alert and it was commonsense to suppose they would be sending
some sort of help to their Forts. However things might pan out we
could not be going wrong if we made the Marmora unhealthy for the
Turkish ships. Lord K. thereupon made the remark that if we could get
one submarine into the Marmora the defences of the Dardanelles would
collapse. "Supposing," he said, "one submarine pops up opposite the
town of Gallipoli and waves a Union Jack three times, the whole
Turkish garrison on the Peninsula will take to their heels and make a
bee line for Bulair."
In reply to a question about Staff, Lord K., in the gruff voice he puts on
when he wants no argument, told me I could not take my own Chief of
Staff, Ellison, and that Braithwaite would go with me in his place.
Ellison and I have worked hand in glove for several years; our qualities

usefully complement one another; there was no earthly reason I could
think of why Ellison should not have come with me, but; I like
Braithwaite; he had been on my General Staff for a time in the
Southern Command; he is cheery, popular and competent.
Wolfe Murray, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, was then called
in, also Archie Murray, Inspector of Home Forces, and Braithwaite.
This was the first (apparently) either of the Murrays had heard of the
project!!! Both seemed to be quite taken aback, and I do not remember
that either of them made a remark.
Braithwaite was very nice and took a chance to whisper his hopes he
would not give me too much cause to regret Ellison. He only said one
thing to K. and that produced an explosion. He said it was vital that we
should have a better air service than the Turks in case it came to
fighting over a small area like the Gallipoli Peninsula: he begged,
therefore, that whatever else we got, or did not get, we might be fitted
out with a contingent of up-to-date aeroplanes, pilots and observers. K.
turned on him with flashing spectacles and rent him with the words,
"Not one!"
15th March, 1915. H.M.S. "Phaeton." Toulon Harbour. Embarked at
Marseilles last night at 6 p.m. and slept on board. Owing to some
mistake no oil fuel had been taken aboard so we have had to come
round here this morning to get it. Have just breakfasted with the
Captain, Cameron by name, and have let the Staff go ashore to see the
town. We do not sail till 2 p.m.: after special trains and everything a
clean chuck-away of 20 hours.
I left off in the S. of S.'s room at the War Office. After the bursting of
the aeroplane bomb K. did most of the talking. I find it hard to
remember all he said: here are the outstanding points:--
(1) We soldiers are to understand we are string Number 2. The sailors
are sure they can force the Dardanelles on their own and the whole
enterprise has been framed on that basis: we are to lie low and to bear
in mind the Cabinet does not want to hear anything of the Army till it
sails through the Straits. But if the Admiral fails, then we will have to

go in.
(2) If the Army has to be used, whether on the Bosphorus or at the
Dardanelles, I am to bear in mind his order that no serious operation is
to take place until the whole of my force is complete; ready;
concentrated and on the spot. No piecemeal attack is to be made.
(3) If we do start fighting, once we have started we are to burn our
boats. Once landed the Government are resolved to see the enterprise
through.
(4) Asia is out of bounds. K. laid special stress on this. Our sea
command and the restricted area of Gallipoli would enable us to
undertake a landing on the Peninsula with clearly limited liabilities.
Once we began marching about continents, situations calling for heavy
reinforcements would probably be created. Although I, Hamilton,
seemed ready to run risks in