Franco-Gallia | Page 6

to give the publick Revenue _arising by Taxes,
for a longer time than that Parliament's own Duration_. I cannot see
why the Members of the first Parliament shou'd (as the Case now
stands) engross to themselves all the Power of giving, as well as all the
Merit and Rewards due to such a Gift: and why succeeding Parliaments
shou'd not, in their turn, have it in their Power to oblige the Prince, or
to streighten him, if they saw Occasion; and pare his Nails, if they were
convinced he made ill Use of such a Revenue. I am sure we have had
Instances of this Kind; and a wise Body of Senators ought always to
provide against the worst that might happen. The Honey-Moon of
Government is a dangerous Season; the Rights and Liberties of the
People run a greater Risk at that time, thro their own Representatives
Compliments and Compliances, than they are ever likely to do during
that Reign: and 'tis safer to break this Practice, when we have the
Prospect of a good and gracious Prince upon the Throne, than when we
have an inflexible Person, who thinks every Offer an Affront, which
comes not up to the Height of what his Predecessor had, without
considering whether it were well or ill done at first.
The Revenues of our Kings, for many Ages, arose out of their
Crown-Lands; Taxes on the Subject were raised only for publick
Exigencies. But since we have turn'd the Stream, and been so free of
Revenues for Life, arising from Impositions and Taxes, we have given
Occasion to our Princes to dispose of their Crown-Lands; and depend
for Maintenance of their Families on such a Sort of Income, as is
thought unjust and ungodly in most Parts of the World, but in
Christendom: for many of the arbitrary Eastern Monarchs think so, and
will not eat the Produce of such a Revenue. Now since Matters are
brought to this pass, 'tis plain that our Princes must subsist suitable to
their high State and Condition, in the best manner we are able to
provide for them. And whilst the Calling and Duration of Parliaments
was precarious, it might indeed be an Act of Imprudence, tho not of

Injustice, for any one Parliament to settle such a Sort of Revenue for
Life on the Prince: But at present, when all the World knows the utmost
Extent of a Parliament's possible Duration, it seems disagreeable to
Reason, and an Encroachment upon the Right of succeeding
Parliaments (for the future) for any one Parliament to do that which
another cannot undo, or has not Power to do in its turn.
An Old Whig is for chusing such Sort of Representatives to serve in
Parliament, as have Estates in the Kingdom; and those not fleeting ones,
which may be sent beyond Sea by Bills of Exchange by every
Pacquet-Boat, but fix'd and permanent. To which end, every Merchant,
Banker, or other money'd Man, who is ambitious of serving his
Country as a Senator, shou'd have also a competent, visible Land
Estate, as a Pledge to his Electors that he intends to abide by them, and
has the same Interest with theirs in the publick Taxes, Gains and Losses.
I have heard and weigh'd the Arguments of those who, in Opposition to
this, urged the Unfitness of such, whose Lands were engaged in Debts
and Mortgages, to serve in Parliament, in comparison with the mony'd
Man who had no Land: But those Arguments never convinced me.
No Man can be a sincere Lover of Liberty, that is not for increasing and
communicating that Blessing to all People; and therefore the giving or
restoring it not only to our Brethren of Scotland and Ireland, but even
to France it self (were it in our Power) is one of the principal Articles
of Whiggism. The Ease and Advantage which wou'd be gain'd by
uniting our own Three Kingdoms upon equal Terms (for upon unequal
it wou'd be no Union) is so visible, that if we had not the Example of
those Masters of the World, the Romans, before our Eyes, one wou'd
wonder that our own Experience (in the Instance of uniting Wales to
England) shou'd not convince us, that altho both Sides wou'd incredibly
gain by it, yet the rich and opulent Country, to which such an Addition
is made, wou'd be the greater Gainer. 'Tis so much more desirable and
secure to govern by Love and common Interest, than by Force; to
expect Comfort and Assistance, in Times of Danger, from our next
Neighbours, than to find them at such a time a _heavy Clog_ upon the
Wheels of our Government, and be in dread lest they should take that
Occasion to shake off an uneasy Yoak: or to