Fighting For Peace | Page 5

Britain, with voluntary service, still had a comparatively small
army: in size "contemptible," as Kaiser Wilhelm called it later, but in
morale and spirit unsurpassed. Evidently the military force of Germany,
which lay like a glittering sword in her ruler's hand, was larger, better
organized and equipped, than any other in the world.

But might it not still be used as a make-weight in the scales of
negotiation rather than as a weapon of actual offense? Might not the
Kaiser still be pleased with his dramatic role of "the war-lord who kept
the peace"? Might he not do again as he did successfully in 1909, when
Austria violated the provisions of the Congress of Berlin (1878) by
annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Germany protected the theft;
and with partial success at Algeciras in 1906, and after the Agadir
incident in 1911, when Germany gained something she wanted though
less than she claimed? Might he not still be content with showing and
shaking the sword, without fleshing it in the body of Europe? It seemed
wiser, because safer for Germany, that the Kaiser should follow that
line. The methodical madness of a forced war looked incredible.
Thus all of us who were interested in the continuance and solidification
of the work of the peace conferences at The Hague reasoned ourselves
into a peaceful hope. We knew that no other power except Germany
was really prepared for war. We knew that the effort to draw Great
Britain into an offensive and defensive alliance with Germany had
failed, although London was willing to promise help to Berlin if
attacked. We remembered Bismarck's warning that a war against
Russia and Great Britain at the same time would be fatal, and we
trusted that it had not been forgotten in Berlin. We knew that Germany,
under her policy of industrial development and pacific penetration, was
prospering more than ever, and we thought she might enjoy that enough
to continue it. We hoped that a third peace conference would be
assembled before a general conflict of arms could be launched, and that
some things might be done there which would make wilful and
aggressive war vastly more dangerous and difficult, if not impossible.
So we were at ease in Zion and worked in the way which seemed most
promising for the peace of the world.
But that way was not included in the German plan. It was remote from
the Berlin-Baghdad-Bahn. It did not lead toward a dominant imperial
state of Mittel-Europa, with tentacles reaching out to ports on every sea
and strait. The plan for another Hague conference failed to interest the
ruling clique at Berlin and Potsdam because they had made "other
arrangements."

Very gradually slight indications of this fact began to appear, though
they were not clearly understood at the time. It was like watching a
stage-curtain which rises very slowly a little way and then stops.
Through the crack one could see feet moving about and hear rumbling
noises. Evidently a drama was in preparation. But what it was to be
could hardly be guessed. Then, after a long wait, the curtain rose
swiftly. The tragedy was revealed. Flames burst forth from the stage
and wrapped the whole house in fire. Some of the spectators were the
first victims. The conflagration still rages. It will not be put out until
the flame-lust is smothered in the hearts of those who kindled and
spread the great fire in Europe.

III
I must get back from this expression of my present feelings and views
to the plain story of the experiences which gradually made me aware of
the actual condition of affairs in Europe and the great obstacle to a
durable peace in the world.
The first thing that disquieted me a little was the strange difficulty
encountered in making the preliminary arrangements for the third peace
conference. The final resolution of the second conference in 1907,
unanimously recommended, first, that the next conference, should be
held within a period of eight years, and second, that a preparatory
committee should be appointed two years beforehand, to consider the
subjects which were ripe for discussion, and to draw up a programme
which could be examined in advance by the countries interested. That,
of course, was necessary. No sensible government will go into a
conference blindfold, without knowing what is to be talked about.
But in 1914, when the matter came into my hands, the lapse of time and
the negligence of the nations (the United States included) had made it
too late to fulfil both of these recommendations. If one was carried out
the other must be modified or disregarded. The then Secretary of State,
Mr. Bryan, instructed me to endeavor to have the conference called in
1915, that is, within the period of eight years.