Explanation of Catholic Morals | Page 6

good,
whereas it is in reality evil. We perceive no malice in the deed, and, in
performing it, there is consequently no malice in us, we do not sin. The
act is said to be materially evil, but formally good; and for such evil
God cannot hold us responsible. Suppose again that we err, and that the
evil we think we do is really good. In this instance, first, the law of
morality is violated,--a certain, though erroneous conscience: this is
sinful. Secondly, a bad motive vitiates an act even if the deed in itself
be good. Consequently, we incur guilt and God's wrath by the
commission of such a deed, which is materially good, but formally bad.
One may wonder and say: "how can guilt attach to doing good?" Guilt
attaches to formal evil, that is, evil that is shown to us by our
conscience and committed by us as such. The wrong comes, not from
the object of our doing which is good, but from the intention which is
bad. It is true that nothing is good that is not thoroughly good, that a
thing is bad only when there is something lacking in its goodness, that
evil is a defect of goodness; but formal evil alone can be imputed to us
and material cannot. The one is a conscious, the other an unconscious,
defect. Here an erroneous conscience is obeyed; there the same

conscience is disregarded. And that kind of a conscience is the rule of
morality; to go against it is to sin.
There are times when we have no certitude. The conscience may have
nothing to say concerning the honesty of a cause to which we are about
to commit ourselves. This state of uncertainty and perplexity is called
doubt. To doubt is to suspend judgment; a dubious conscience is one
that does not function.
In doubt the question may be: "To do; is it right or wrong? May I
perform this act, or must I abstain therefrom?" In this case, we inquire
whether it be lawful or unlawful to go on, but we are sure that it is
lawful not to act. There is but one course to pursue. We must not
commit ourselves and must refrain from acting, until such a time, at
least, as, by inquiring and considering, we shall have obtained
sufficient evidence to convince us that we may allow ourselves this
liberty without incurring guilt. If, on the contrary, while still doubting,
we persist in committing the act, we sin, because in all affairs of right
and wrong we must follow a certain conscience as the standard of
morality.
But the question may be: "To do or not to do; which is right and which
is wrong?" Here we know not which way to turn, fearing evil in either
alternative. We must do one thing or the other. There are reasons and
difficulties on both sides. We are unable to resolve the difficulties, lay
the doubt, and form a sure conscience, what must we do?
If all action can be momentarily suspended, and we have the means of
consulting, we must abstain from action and consult. If the affair is
urgent, and this cannot be done; if we must act on the spot and decide
for ourselves, then, we can make that dubious conscience prudently
certain by applying this principle to our conduct: "Of two evils, choose
the lesser." We therefore judge which action involves the least amount
of evil. We may embrace the course thus chosen without a fear of doing
wrong. If we have inadvertently chosen the greater evil, it is an error of
judgment for which we are in nowise responsible before God. But this
means must be employed only where all other and surer means fail. The
certainty we thereby acquire is a prudent certainty, and is sufficient to

guarantee us against offending.

CHAPTER IV.
LAXITY AND SCRUPLES.
IN every question of conscience there are two opposing factors: Liberty,
which is agreeable to our nature, which allows us to do as we list; and
Law which binds us unto the observance of what is unpleasant. Liberty
and law are mutually antagonistic. A concession in favor of one is an
infringement upon the claims of the other.
Conscience, in its normal state, gives to liberty and to law what to each
is legitimately due, no more, no less.
Truth lies between extremes. At the two opposite poles of
conscientious rectitude are laxity and scruples, one judging all things
lawful, the other all things forbidden. One inordinately favors liberty,
the other the law. And neither has sufficient grounds on which to form
a sound judgment.
They are counterfeit consciences, the one dishonest, the other
unreasonable. They do unlawful business; and because the verdict they
render is founded on nothing