Experiences of a Dug-out, 1914-1918 | Page 4

-- Arrival
of General Pershing in London -- I form one of the party that proceeds
to Devonport to meet Colonel House and the United States
Commissioners -- Its adventures -- Admirals adrift -- Mr. Balfour
meets the Commissioners at Paddington.
CHAPTER VIII
THE NEAR EAST........................................... 152
The first talk about Salonika -- The railway and the port -- The question
of operations based on Macedonia at the end of 1914 -- Failure of
"easterners" to realize that the Western Front was Germany's weakest
front -- Question whether it might not have been better to go to
Salonika than to the Dardanelles -- Objections to this plan -- The
problem of Bulgaria -- Consequences of the Russian débâcle --
Difficulty of the Near Eastern problem in the early summer -- An
example of how the Dardanelles Committee approached it --
Awkwardness of the problem after the failure of Sir I. Hamilton's
August offensive -- The Bulgarian attitude -- Entente's objection to
Serbia attacking Bulgaria -- I am ordered to Salonika, but order
countermanded -- The disaster to Serbia -- Hard to say what ought to
have been done -- Real mistake, the failure to abandon the Dardanelles
enterprise in May -- The French attitude about Salonika -- General
Sarrail -- French General Staff impressed with War Office information
concerning Macedonia -- Unsatisfactory situation at the end of 1915 --
The Salonika business a blunder all through -- Eventual success does
not alter this.
CHAPTER IX
OTHER SIDE-SHOWS........................................ 170

Three categories of side-shows -- The Jackson Committee -- The
Admiralty's attitude -- The Pacific, Duala, Tanga, Dar-es-Salaam,
Oceania, the Wireless Stations -- Kiao Chao -- The Shatt-el-Arab --
Egypt -- Question whether the Australasian forces ought to have been
kept for the East -- The East African operations -- Our lack of
preparation for a campaign in this quarter -- Something wrong -- My
own visit to Tanga and Dar-es-Salaam in 1908 -- The bad start of the
campaign -- Question of utilizing South African troops to restore the
situation -- How this was managed -- Reasons why this was a
justifiable side-show -- Mesopotamia -- The War Office ought to have
interfered -- The question of an advance on Baghdad by General
Townshend suddenly referred to the General Staff -- Our mistake --
The question of Egyptian defence in the latter part of 1915 -- The
Alexandretta project -- A later Alexandretta project propounded by the
War Cabinet in 1917 -- Its absurdity -- The amateur strategist on the
war-path -- The Palestine campaign of 1918 carried out almost entirely
by troops not required on the Western Front, and therefore a legitimate
side-show -- The same principle to some extent holds good with regard
to the conquest of Mesopotamia -- The Downing Street project to
substitute Sir W. Robertson for Sir C. Monro, a miss-fire.
CHAPTER X
THE MUNITIONS QUESTION.................................. 190
Mr. Asquith's Newcastle speech -- The mischief that it did -- The time
that must elapse before any great expansion in output of munitions can
begin to materialize -- The situation analogous to that of a building --
The Ministry of Munitions was given and took the credit for the
expansion in output for the year subsequent to its creation, which was
in reality the work of the War Office -- The Northcliffe Press stunt
about shell shortage -- Its misleading character -- Sir H. Dalziel's attack
upon General von Donop in the House -- Mr. Lloyd George's reply -- A
discreditable episode -- Misapprehension on the subject of the army's
preparedness for war in respect to material -- Misunderstanding as to
the machine-gun position -- Lord French's attack upon the War Office
with regard to Munitions -- His responsibility for the lack of heavy

artillery -- The matter taken up at the War Office before he ever raised
it from G.H.Q. -- His responsibility for the absence of high-explosive
shell for our field artillery -- A misconception as to the rôle of the
General Staff -- The serious difficulty that arose with regard to this
ammunition owing to prematures -- The misstatements in "1914" as to
the amount of artillery ammunition which was sent across France to the
Dardanelles -- Exaggerated estimates by factories as to what they
would be able to turn out -- Their estimates discounted as a result of
later experiences -- The Munitions Ministry not confined to its proper
job -- The incident of 400 Tanks -- Conclusion.
CHAPTER XI
COUNCILS, COMMITTEES, AND CABINETS...................... 208
The responsibilities of experts at War Councils -- The Rt. Hon. A.
Fisher's views -- Discussion as to whether these meet the case -- Under
the War Cabinet system, the question does not arise -- The Committee
of Imperial Defence merged in the War Council early in the conflict --
The