Experiences of a Dug-out, 1914-1918 | Page 4

the port -- The question of operations based on Macedonia at the end of 1914 -- Failure of "easterners" to realize that the Western Front was Germany's weakest front -- Question whether it might not have been better to go to Salonika than to the Dardanelles -- Objections to this plan -- The problem of Bulgaria -- Consequences of the Russian débacle -- Difficulty of the Near Eastern problem in the early summer -- An example of how the Dardanelles Committee approached it -- Awkwardness of the problem after the failure of Sir I. Hamilton's August offensive -- The Bulgarian attitude -- Entente's objection to Serbia attacking Bulgaria -- I am ordered to Salonika, but order countermanded -- The disaster to Serbia -- Hard to say what ought to have been done -- Real mistake, the failure to abandon the Dardanelles enterprise in May -- The French attitude about Salonika -- General Sarrail -- French General Staff impressed with War Office information concerning Macedonia -- Unsatisfactory situation at the end of 1915 -- The Salonika business a blunder all through -- Eventual success does not alter this.
CHAPTER IX
OTHER SIDE-SHOWS........................................ 170
Three categories of side-shows -- The Jackson Committee -- The Admiralty's attitude -- The Pacific, Duala, Tanga, Dar-es-Salaam, Oceania, the Wireless Stations -- Kiao Chao -- The Shatt-el-Arab -- Egypt -- Question whether the Australasian forces ought to have been kept for the East -- The East African operations -- Our lack of preparation for a campaign in this quarter -- Something wrong -- My own visit to Tanga and Dar-es-Salaam in 1908 -- The bad start of the campaign -- Question of utilizing South African troops to restore the situation -- How this was managed -- Reasons why this was a justifiable side-show -- Mesopotamia -- The War Office ought to have interfered -- The question of an advance on Baghdad by General Townshend suddenly referred to the General Staff -- Our mistake -- The question of Egyptian defence in the latter part of 1915 -- The Alexandretta project -- A later Alexandretta project propounded by the War Cabinet in 1917 -- Its absurdity -- The amateur strategist on the war-path -- The Palestine campaign of 1918 carried out almost entirely by troops not required on the Western Front, and therefore a legitimate side-show -- The same principle to some extent holds good with regard to the conquest of Mesopotamia -- The Downing Street project to substitute Sir W. Robertson for Sir C. Monro, a miss-fire.
CHAPTER X
THE MUNITIONS QUESTION.................................. 190
Mr. Asquith's Newcastle speech -- The mischief that it did -- The time that must elapse before any great expansion in output of munitions can begin to materialize -- The situation analogous to that of a building -- The Ministry of Munitions was given and took the credit for the expansion in output for the year subsequent to its creation, which was in reality the work of the War Office -- The Northcliffe Press stunt about shell shortage -- Its misleading character -- Sir H. Dalziel's attack upon General von Donop in the House -- Mr. Lloyd George's reply -- A discreditable episode -- Misapprehension on the subject of the army's preparedness for war in respect to material -- Misunderstanding as to the machine-gun position -- Lord French's attack upon the War Office with regard to Munitions -- His responsibility for the lack of heavy artillery -- The matter taken up at the War Office before he ever raised it from G.H.Q. -- His responsibility for the absence of high-explosive shell for our field artillery -- A misconception as to the r?le of the General Staff -- The serious difficulty that arose with regard to this ammunition owing to prematures -- The misstatements in "1914" as to the amount of artillery ammunition which was sent across France to the Dardanelles -- Exaggerated estimates by factories as to what they would be able to turn out -- Their estimates discounted as a result of later experiences -- The Munitions Ministry not confined to its proper job -- The incident of 400 Tanks -- Conclusion.
CHAPTER XI
COUNCILS, COMMITTEES, AND CABINETS...................... 208
The responsibilities of experts at War Councils -- The Rt. Hon. A. Fisher's views -- Discussion as to whether these meet the case -- Under the War Cabinet system, the question does not arise -- The Committee of Imperial Defence merged in the War Council early in the conflict -- The Dardanelles Committee -- Finding a formula -- Mr. Churchill backs up Sir I. Hamilton -- The spirit of compromise -- The Cabinet carrying on pari passu with the Dardanelles Committee -- Personal experiences with the Cabinet -- The War Council which succeeded the Dardanelles Committee -- An illustration of the value of the War Cabinet system -- Some of its inconveniences -- Ministers