Experiences of a Dug-out, 1914-1918 | Page 2

Charles Edward Callwell
Goodwins -- Difficulty of the strategical situation -- Death of Sir C. Douglas.
CHAPTER III
LORD KITCHENER'S START................................... 42
A first meeting with Lord Kitchener -- Sent up to see him in Pretoria by his brother under unpromising conditions -- The interview -- The Chief's pleasant reception -- A story of Lord K. from the Sudan -- An unpleasant interview with him in August 1914 -- Rare meetings with him during the first two or three months -- His ignorance of War Office organization -- His lack of acquaintance with many matters in connection with the existing organization of the army -- His indisposition to listen to advice on such subjects -- Lord K. shy of strangers -- His treatment of the Territorial Forces -- Their weak point at the outset of hostilities, not having the necessary strength to mobilize at war establishment -- Effect of this on the general plans -- The way the Territorials dwindled after taking the field -- Lord K. inclined at first to pile up divisions without providing them with the requisite reservoirs of reserves -- His feat in organizing five regular divisions in addition to those in the Expeditionary Force -- His immediate recognition of the magnitude of the contest -- He makes things hum in the War Office -- His differences of opinion with G.H.Q. -- The inability of G.H.Q. to realize that a vast expansion of the military forces was the matter of primary importance -- Lord K.'s relations with Sir J. French -- The despatch of Sir H. Smith-Dorrien to command the Second Corps -- Sir J. French not well treated at the time of the Antwerp affair -- The relegation of the General Staff at the War Office to the background in the early days -- Question whether this was entirely due to its having suffered in efficiency by the withdrawals which took place on mobilization -- The General Staff only eliminated in respect to operations.
CHAPTER IV
LORD KITCHENER'S LATER RECORD............................ 60
The munitions question and the Dardanelles to be dealt with later -- The Alexandretta project of the winter of 1914-15 -- Such an operation presented little difficulty then -- H.M.S. Doris' doings -- The scheme abandoned -- I am sent to Paris about the Italian conventions just after the Dardanelles landings -- Concern at the situation after the troops had got ashore at Helles and Anzac -- A talk with Lord K. and Sir E. Grey -- Its consequences -- Lord K. seemed to have lost some of his confidence in his own judgement with regard to operations questions -- The question of the withdrawal of the Queen Elizabeth from the Aegean -- The discussion about it at the Admiralty -- Lord K.'s inability to take some of his colleagues at their own valuation -- Does not know some of their names -- Another officer of distinction gets them mixed up in his mind -- Lord K.'s disappointment at the early failures of the New Army divisions -- His impatience when he wanted anything in a hurry -- My own experiences -- Typists' idiosyncrasies aggravate the trouble -- Lord K. in an unreasonable mood -- His knowledge of French -- His skilful handling of a Portuguese mission -- His readiness to see foreign officers when asked to do so -- How he handled them -- The Serbian Military Attaché asks for approval of an attack by his country upon Bulgaria at the time of Bulgarian mobilization -- A dramatic interview with Lord K. -- Confidence placed in him with regard to munitions by the Russians -- His speeches in the House of Lords -- The heat of his room -- His preoccupation about the safety of Egypt -- He disapproves of the General Staff plan with regard to its defence -- His attitude with regard to national service -- His difficulties in this matter -- His anxiety to have a reserve in hand for delivering the decisive blow in the war -- My last meeting with him -- His pleasure in going to Russia -- His failure to accomplish his mission, a great disaster to the Entente cause -- A final word about him -- He did more than any man on the side of the Allies to win the war -- Fitz.
CHAPTER V
THE DARDANELLES.......................................... 86
The Tabah incident -- The Dardanelles memorandum of 1906 -- Special steps taken with regard to it by Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman -- Mr. Churchill first raises the question -- My conference with him in October 1914 -- The naval project against the Straits -- Its fundamental errors -- Would never have been carried into effect had there been a conference between the Naval War Staff and the General Staff -- The bad start -- The causes of the final failure on the 18th of March -- Lord K.'s
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