Evolution, Old New | Page 4

a series of accidental variations,
each one of which was thrown for, as it were, with dice?
We shall most of us feel that there must have been a little cheating
somewhere with these accidental variations before the eagle could have
become so great a winner.

I believe I have now stated the question at issue so plainly that there
can be no mistake about its nature, I will therefore proceed to show as
briefly as possible what have been the positions taken in regard to it by
our forefathers, by the leaders of opinion now living, and what I believe
will be the next conclusion that will be adopted for any length of time
by any considerable number of people.
In the times of the ancients the preponderance of opinion was in favour
of teleology, though impugners were not wanting. Aristotle[1] leant
towards a denial of purpose, while Plato[2] was a firm believer in
design. From the days of Plato to our own times, there have been but
few objectors to the teleological or purposive view of nature. If an
animal had an eye, that eye was regarded as something which had been
designed in order to enable its owner to see after such fashion as should
be most to its advantage.
This, however, is now no longer the prevailing opinion either in this
country or in Germany.
Professor Haeckel holds a high place among the leaders of German
philosophy at the present day. He declares a belief in evolution and in
purposiveness to be incompatible, and denies purpose in language
which holds out little prospect of a compromise.
"As soon, in fact," he writes, "as we acknowledge the exclusive activity
of the physico-chemical causes in living (organic) bodies as well as in
so-called inanimate (inorganic) nature,"--and this is what Professor
Haeckel holds we are bound to do if we accept the theory of descent
with modification--"we concede exclusive dominion to that view of the
universe, which we may designate as mechanical, and which is
opposed to the teleological conception. If we compare all the ideas of
the universe prevalent among different nations at different times, we
can divide them all into two sharply contrasted groups--a causal or
mechanical, and a teleological or vitalistic. The latter has prevailed
generally in biology until now, and accordingly the animal and
vegetable kingdoms have been considered as the products of a creative
power, acting for a definite purpose. In the contemplation of every
organism, the unavoidable conviction seemed to press itself upon us,

that such a wonderful machine, so complicated an apparatus for motion
as exists in the organism, could only be produced by a power analogous
to, but infinitely more powerful than the power of man in the
construction of his machines."[3]
A little lower down he continues:--
"I maintain with regard to" this "much talked of 'purpose in nature' that
it has no existence but for those persons who observe phenomena in
plants and animals in the most superficial manner. Without going more
deeply into the matter, we can see at once that the rudimentary organs
are a formidable obstacle to this theory. And, indeed, anyone who
makes a really close study of the organization and mode of life of the
various animals and plants, ... must necessarily come to the conclusion,
that this 'purposiveness' no more exists than the much talked of
'beneficence' of the Creator."[4]
Professor Haeckel justly sees no alternative between, upon the one
hand, the creation of independent species by a Personal God--by a
"Creator," in fact, who "becomes an organism, who designs a plan,
reflects upon and varies this plan, and finally forms creatures according
to it, as a human architect would construct his building,"[5]--and the
denial of all plan or purpose whatever. There can be no question but
that he is right here. To talk of a "designer" who has no tangible
existence, no organism with which to think, no bodily mechanism with
which to carry his purposes into effect; whose design is not design
inasmuch as it has to contend with no impediments from ignorance or
impotence, and who thus contrives but by a sort of make-believe in
which there is no contrivance; who has a familiar name, but nothing
beyond a name which any human sense has ever been able to
perceive--this is an abuse of words--an attempt to palm off a shadow
upon our understandings as though it were a substance. It is plain
therefore that there must either be a designer who "becomes an
organism, designs a plan, &c.," or that there can be no designer at all
and hence no design.
We have seen which of these alternatives Professor Haeckel has
adopted. He holds that those who accept evolution are bound to reject

all "purposiveness." And here, as I have intimated, I