Euthyphro | Page 4

know him to be a murderer; but you are assuming
the point at issue. If all the circumstances of the case are considered,
are you able to show that your father was guilty of murder, or that all
the gods are agreed in approving of our prosecution of him? And must
you not allow that what is hated by one god may be liked by another?
Waiving this last, however, Socrates proposes to amend the definition,
and say that 'what all the gods love is pious, and what they all hate is
impious.' To this Euthyphro agrees.
Socrates proceeds to analyze the new form of the definition. He shows
that in other cases the act precedes the state; e.g. the act of being
carried, loved, etc. precedes the state of being carried, loved, etc., and
therefore that which is dear to the gods is dear to the gods because it is
first loved of them, not loved of them because it is dear to them. But
the pious or holy is loved by the gods because it is pious or holy, which
is equivalent to saying, that it is loved by them because it is dear to
them. Here then appears to be a contradiction,--Euthyphro has been

giving an attribute or accident of piety only, and not the essence.
Euthyphro acknowledges himself that his explanations seem to walk
away or go round in a circle, like the moving figures of Daedalus, the
ancestor of Socrates, who has communicated his art to his descendants.
Socrates, who is desirous of stimulating the indolent intelligence of
Euthyphro, raises the question in another manner: 'Is all the pious just?'
'Yes.' 'Is all the just pious?' 'No.' 'Then what part of justice is piety?'
Euthyphro replies that piety is that part of justice which 'attends' to the
gods, as there is another part of justice which 'attends' to men. But what
is the meaning of 'attending' to the gods? The word 'attending,' when
applied to dogs, horses, and men, implies that in some way they are
made better. But how do pious or holy acts make the gods any better?
Euthyphro explains that he means by pious acts, acts of service or
ministration. Yes; but the ministrations of the husbandman, the
physician, and the builder have an end. To what end do we serve the
gods, and what do we help them to accomplish? Euthyphro replies, that
all these difficult questions cannot be resolved in a short time; and he
would rather say simply that piety is knowing how to please the gods in
word and deed, by prayers and sacrifices. In other words, says Socrates,
piety is 'a science of asking and giving'--asking what we want and
giving what they want; in short, a mode of doing business between
gods and men. But although they are the givers of all good, how can we
give them any good in return? 'Nay, but we give them honour.' Then we
give them not what is beneficial, but what is pleasing or dear to them;
and this is the point which has been already disproved.
Socrates, although weary of the subterfuges and evasions of Euthyphro,
remains unshaken in his conviction that he must know the nature of
piety, or he would never have prosecuted his old father. He is still
hoping that he will condescend to instruct him. But Euthyphro is in a
hurry and cannot stay. And Socrates' last hope of knowing the nature of
piety before he is prosecuted for impiety has disappeared. As in the
Euthydemus the irony is carried on to the end.
The Euthyphro is manifestly designed to contrast the real nature of
piety and impiety with the popular conceptions of them. But when the

popular conceptions of them have been overthrown, Socrates does not
offer any definition of his own: as in the Laches and Lysis, he prepares
the way for an answer to the question which he has raised; but true to
his own character, refuses to answer himself.
Euthyphro is a religionist, and is elsewhere spoken of, if he be the same
person, as the author of a philosophy of names, by whose 'prancing
steeds' Socrates in the Cratylus is carried away. He has the conceit and
self- confidence of a Sophist; no doubt that he is right in prosecuting
his father has ever entered into his mind. Like a Sophist too, he is
incapable either of framing a general definition or of following the
course of an argument. His wrong-headedness, one-sidedness,
narrowness, positiveness, are characteristic of his priestly office. His
failure to apprehend an argument may be compared to a similar defect
which is observable in the rhapsode Ion. But he is not a bad man, and
he is friendly to Socrates, whose familiar sign he recognizes with
interest. Though