Ethics | Page 9

that Aristotle conceives of this life as one of intense activity
or energising: it is just this which gives it its supremacy. In spite of the almost religious
fervour with which he speaks of it ("the most orthodox of his disciples" paraphrases his
meaning by describing its content as "the service and vision of God"), it is clear that he
identified it with the life of the philosopher, as he understood it, a life of ceaseless
intellectual activity in which at least at times all the distractions and disturbances
inseparable from practical life seemed to disappear and become as nothing. This ideal
was partly an inheritance from the more ardent idealism of his master Plato, but partly it
was the expression of personal experience.
The nobility of this ideal cannot be questioned; the conception of the end of man or a life
lived for truth--of a life blissfully absorbed in the vision of truth--is a lofty and inspiring

one. But we cannot resist certain criticisms upon its presentation by Aristotle: (1) the
relation of it to the lower ideal of practice is left somewhat obscure; (2) it is described in
such a way as renders its realisation possible only to a gifted few, and under exceptional
circumstances; (3) it seems in various ways, as regards its content, to be unnecessarily
and unjustifiably limited. But it must be borne in mind that this is a first endeavour to
determine its principle, and that similar failures have attended the attempts to describe the
"religious" or the "spiritual" ideals of life, which have continually been suggested by the
apparently inherent limitations of the "practical" or "moral" life, which is the subject of
Moral Philosophy.
The Moral Ideal to those who have most deeply reflected on it leads to the thought of an
Ideal beyond and above it, which alone gives it meaning, but which seems to escape from
definite conception by man. The richness and variety of this Ideal ceaselessly invite, but
as ceaselessly defy, our attempts to imprison it in a definite formula or portray it in
detailed imagination. Yet the thought of it is and remains inexpungable from our minds.
This conception of the best life is not forgotten in the Politics The end of life in the state
is itself well-living and well-doing--a life which helps to produce the best life The great
agency in the production of such life is the State operating through Law, which is Reason
backed by Force. For its greatest efficiency there is required the development of a science
of legislation. The main drift of what he says here is that the most desirable thing would
be that the best reason of the community should be embodied in its laws. But so far as
that is not possible, it still is true that anyone who would make himself and others better
must become a miniature legislator--must study the general principles of law, morality,
and education. The conception of [Grek: politikae] with which he opened the Ethics
would serve as a guide to a father educating his children as well as to the legislator
legislating for the state. Finding in his predecessors no developed doctrine on this subject,
Aristotle proposes himself to undertake the construction of it, and sketches in advance the
programme of the Politics in the concluding sentence of the Ethics His ultimate object is
to answer the questions, What is the best form of Polity, how should each be constituted,
and what laws and customs should it adopt and employ? Not till this answer is given will
"the philosophy of human affairs" be complete.
On looking back it will be seen that the discussion of the central topic of the nature and
formation of character has expanded into a Philosophy of Human Conduct, merging at its
beginning and end into metaphysics The result is a Moral Philosophy set against a
background of Political Theory and general Philosophy. The most characteristic features
of this Moral Philosophy are due to the fact of its essentially teleological view of human
life and action: (1) Every human activity, but especially every human practical activity, is
directed towards a simple End discoverable by reflection, and this End is conceived of as
the object of universal human desire, as something to be enjoyed, not as something which
ought to be done or enacted. Anstotle's Moral Philosophy is not hedonistic but it is
eudæmomstic, the end is the enjoyment of Happiness, not the fulfilment of Duty. (2)
Every human practical activity derives its value from its efficiency as a means to that end,
it is good or bad, right or wrong, as it conduces or fails to conduce to Happiness Thus his
Moral Philosophy is essentially utilitarian or prudential Right action presupposes
Thought or Thinking, partly on the development of a