Ethics | Page 2

what goodness or virtue is, and how it is to be reached, remains mere
theory or talk. By itself it does not enable us to become, or to help others to become,
good. For this it is necessary to bring into play the great force of the Political Community
or State, of which the main instrument is Law. Hence arises the demand for the necessary
complement to the _Ethics, i.e._, a treatise devoted to the questions which centre round
the enquiry; by what organisation of social or political forces, by what laws or institutions
can we best secure the greatest amount of good character?
We must, however, remember that the production of good character is not the end of
either individual or state action: that is the aim of the one and the other because good
character is the indispensable condition and chief determinant of happiness, itself the goal
of all human doing. The end of all action, individual or collective, is the greatest
happiness of the greatest number. There is, Aristotle insists, no difference of kind
between the good of one and the good of many or all. The sole difference is one of
amount or scale. This does not mean simply that the State exists to secure in larger
measure the objects of degree which the isolated individual attempts, but is too feeble, to
secure without it. On the contrary, it rather insists that whatever goods society alone
enables a man to secure have always had to the individual--whether he realised it or
not--the value which, when so secured, he recognises them to possess. The best and
happiest life for the individual is that which the State renders possible, and this it does
mainly by revealing to him the value of new objects of desire and educating him to
appreciate them. To Aristotle or to Plato the State is, above all, a large and powerful
educative agency which gives the individual increased opportunities of self-development
and greater capacities for the enjoyment of life.
Looking forward, then, to the life of the State as that which aids support, and combines
the efforts of the individual to obtain happiness, Aristotle draws no hard and fast
distinction between the spheres of action of Man as individual and Man as citizen. Nor
does the division of his discussion into the Ethics and the Politics rest upon any such
distinction. The distinction implied is rather between two stages in the life of the civilised
man--the stage of preparation for the full life of the adult citizen, and the stage of the
actual exercise or enjoyment of citizenship. Hence the Ethics, where his attention is
directed upon the formation of character, is largely and centrally a treatise on Moral
Education. It discusses especially those admirable human qualities which fit a man for
life in an organised civic community, which makes him "a good citizen," and considers
how they can be fostered or created and their opposites prevented.
This is the kernel of the Ethics, and all the rest is subordinate to this main interest and
purpose. Yet "the rest" is not irrelevant; the whole situation in which character grows and
operates is concretely conceived. There is a basis of what we should call Psychology,
sketched in firm outlines, the deeper presuppositions and the wider issues of human
character and conduct are not ignored, and there is no little of what we should call
Metaphysics. But neither the Psychology nor the Metaphysics is elaborated, and only so
much is brought forward as appears necessary to put the main facts in their proper
perspective and setting. It is this combination of width of outlook with close observation
of the concrete facts of conduct which gives its abiding value to the work, and justifies
the view of it as containing Aristotle's Moral Philosophy. Nor is it important merely as

summing up the moral judgments and speculations of an age now long past. It seizes and
dwells upon those elements and features in human practice which are most essential and
permanent, and it is small wonder that so much in it survives in our own ways of
regarding conduct and speaking of it. Thus it still remains one of the classics of Moral
Philosophy, nor is its value likely soon to be exhausted.
As was pointed out above, the proem (Book I., cc. i-iii.) is a prelude to the treatment of
the whole subject covered by the Ethics and the Politics together. It sets forth the purpose
of the enquiry, describes the spirit in which it is to be undertaken and what ought to be
the expectation of the reader, and lastly states the necessary conditions of studying it with
profit. The aim of it is the acquisition and propagation of a certain kind of knowledge
(science), but this