Ethics, part 5 | Page 9

or to a lesser perfection (I:xx.Coroll.ii.); therefore (by
Def. of the Emotions:ii., &iii.) he is not affected by any emotion of
pleasure or pain.
Corollary. Strictly speaking, God does not love or hate anyone. For
God (by the foregoing Prop.) is not affected by any emotion of pleasure
or pain, consequently (Def. of the Emotions:vi., &vii.) he does not love
or hate anyone.
Prop.XVIII. No one can hate God.
Proof.- The idea of God which is in us is adequate and perfect (II:xlvi.,
II:xlvii.); wherefore, in so far as we contemplate God, we are active
(III:iii.) ; consequently (III:lix.) there can be no pain accompanied by
the idea of God, in other words (Def. of the Emotions:vii.), no one can
hate God. Q.E.D.
Corollary.- Love towards God cannot be turned into hate.

Note.- It may be objected that, as we understand God as the cause of all
things, we by that very fact regard God as the cause of pain. But I make
answer, that, in so far as we understand the causes of pain, it to that
extent (V:iii.) ceases to be a passion, that is, it ceases to be pain
(III:lix.); therefore, in so far as we understand God to be the cause of
pain, we to that extent feel pleasure.
Prop. XIX. He, who loves God, cannot endeavour that God should love
him in return.
Proof.- For, if a man should so endeavour, he would desire
(V:xvii.Coroll.) that God, whom he loves, should not be God, and
consequently he would desire to feel pain (III:xix.); which is absurd
(III:xxviii.). Therefore, he who loves God, &c. Q.E.D.
Prop. XX. This love towards God cannot be stained by the emotion of
envy or jealousy: contrariwise, it is the more fostered, in proportion as
we conceive a greater number of men to be joined to God by the same
bond of love.
Proof.- This love towards God is the highest good which we can seek
for under the guidance of reason (IV:xxviii.), it is common to all men
(IV:xxxvi),and we desire that all should rejoice therein (IV:xxxvii.);
therefore (Def. of the Emotions:xxiii), it cannot be stained by the
emotion envy nor by, the emotion of jealousy, (V:xviii. see definition
of Jealousy, (III:xxxv. Note); but, contrariwise, it must needs be the
more fostered, in proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to
rejoice therein. Q.E.D.
Note.- We can in the same way, show, that there is no emotion directly
contrary to this love, whereby this love can be destroyed; therefore we
may conclude, that this love towards God is the most constant of all the
emotions, and that, in so far as it is referred to the body, it cannot be
destroyed, unless the body be destroyed also. As to its nature, in so far
as it is referred to the mind only, we shall presently inquire. I have now
gone through all the remedies against the emotions, or all that the mind,
considered in itself alone, can do against them. Whence it appears that
the mind's power over the emotions consists:-
I. In the actual knowledge of the emotions (V:iv.Note).
II. In the fact that it separates the emotions from the thought of an
external cause, which we conceive confusedly (V:ii. and V:iv.Note).
III. In the fact, that, in respect to time, the emotions referred to things,

which we distinctly understand, surpass those referred to what we
conceive in a confused and fragmentary manner (V:vii.).
IV. In the number of causes whereby those modifications (Affectiones.
Camerer reads affectus - emotions), are fostered, which have regard to
the common properties of things or to God (V:ix., V:xi.).
V. Lastly, in the order wherein the mind can arrange and associate, one
with another, its own emotions (V:x.Note and V:xii., V:xiii., V:xiv.).
But, in order that this power of the mind over the emotions may be
better understood, it should be specially observed that the emotions are
called by us strong, when we compare the emotion of one man with the
emotion of another, and see that one man is more troubled than another
by the same emotion; or when we are comparing the various emotions
of the same man one with another, and find that he is more affected or
stirred by one emotion than by another. For the strength of every
emotion is defined by a comparison of our own power with the power
of an external cause. Now the power of the mind is defined by
knowledge only, and its infirmity or passion is defined by the privation
of knowledge only: it therefore follows, that that mind is most passive,
whose greatest part is made up of inadequate ideas, so that it may be
characterized more readily by its passive states than by its activities: on
the other hand, that