Ethics, part 1 | Page 9

can exist without the other, and
can remain in its original condition. As, then, there does not exist a
vacuum in nature (of which anon), but all parts are bound to come
together to prevent it, it follows from this that the parts cannot really be
distinguished, and that extended substance in so far as it is substance
cannot be divided.
If anyone asks me the further question, Why are we naturally so prone
to divide quantity? I answer, that quantity is conceived by us in two
ways; in the abstract and superficially, as we imagine it; or as substance,
as we conceive it solely by the intellect. If, then, we regard quantity as
it is represented in our imagination, which we often and more easily do,
we shall find that it is finite, divisible, and compounded of parts; but if
we regard it as it is represented in our intellect, and conceive it as
substance, which it is very difficult to do, we shall then, as I have

sufficiently proved, find that it is infinite, one, and indivisible. This will
be plain enough to all who make a distinction between the intellect and
the imagination, especially if it be remembered that matter is
everywhere the same, that its parts are not distinguishable, except in so
far as we conceive matter as diversely modified, whence its parts are
distinguished, not really, but modally. For instance, water, in so far as it
is water, we conceive to be divided, and its parts to be separated one
from the other; but not in so far as it is extended substance; from this
point of view it is neither separated nor divisible. Further, water, in so
far as it is water, is produced and corrupted; but, in so far as it is
substance, it is neither produced nor corrupted.
I think I have now answered the second argument; it is, in fact, founded
on the same assumption as the first--namely, that matter, in so far as it
is substance, is divisible, and composed of parts. Even if it were so, I
do not know why it should be considered unworthy of the divine nature,
inasmuch as besides God (by Prop. xiv.) no substance can be granted,
wherefrom it could receive its modifications. All things, I repeat, are in
God, and all things which come to pass, come to pass solely through
the laws of the infinite nature of God, and follow (as I will shortly
show) from the necessity of his essence. Wherefore it can in nowise be
said that God is passive in respect to anything other than himself, or
that extended substance is unworthy of the divine nature, even if it be
supposed divisible, so long as it is granted to be infinite and eternal.
But enough of this for the present.
XVI. From the necessity of the divine nature must follow an infinite
number of things in infinite ways--that is, all things which can fall
within the sphere of infinite intellect.
>>>>>Proof--This proposition will be clear to everyone, who
remembers that from the given definition of any thing the intellect
infers several properties, which really necessarily follow therefrom
(that is, from the actual essence of the thing defined); and it infers more
properties in proportion as the definition of the thing expresses more
reality, that is, in proportion as the essence of the thing defined
involves more reality. Now, as the divine nature has absolutely infinite
attributes (by Def. vi.), of which each expresses infinite essence after
its kind, it follows that from the necessity of its nature an infinite
number of things (that is, everything which can fall within the sphere of

an infinite intellect) must necessarily follow. Q.E.D.
<<<< all that can fall within the sphere of an infinite intellect.
<<<< not through an accident of his nature.
<<<< cause.
XVII. God acts solely by the laws of his own nature, and is not
constrained by anyone.
>>>>>Proof--We have just shown (in Prop. xvi.), that solely from the
necessity of the divine nature, or, what is the same thing, solely from
the laws of his nature, an infinite number of things absolutely follow in
an infinite number of ways; and we proved (in Prop. xv.), that without
God nothing can be nor be conceived; but that all things are in God.
Wherefore nothing can exist outside himself, whereby he can be
conditioned or constrained to act. Wherefore God acts solely by the
laws of his own nature, and is not constrained by anyone. Q.E.D.
<<<< either extrinsically or intrinsically, besides