Ethics, part 1 | Page 3

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Benedict de Spinoza, THE ETHICS (Ethica Ordine Geometrico
Demonstrata)
Translated by R. H. M. Elwes

PART I: CONCERNING GOD.
DEFINITIONS.
I. By that which is 'self-caused' I mean that of which the essence
involves existence, or that of which the nature is only conceivable as
existent.

II. A thing is called 'finite after its kind' when it can be limited by
another thing of the same nature; for instance, a body is called finite
because we always conceive another greater body. So, also, a thought is
limited by another thought, but a body is not limited by thought, nor a
thought by body.
III. By 'substance' I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived
through itself: in other words, that of which a conception can be formed
independently of any other conception.
IV. By 'attribute' I mean that which the intellect perceives as
constituting the essence of substance.
V. By 'mode' I mean the modifications ("affectiones") of substance, or
that which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than
itself.
VI. By 'God' I mean a being absolutely infinite--that is, a substance
consisting in infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and
infinite essentiality.
>>>>>Explanation--I say absolutely infinite, not infinite after its kind:
for, of a thing infinite only after its kind, infinite attributes may be
denied; but that which is absolutely infinite, contains in its essence
whatever expresses reality, and involves no negation.
VII. That thing is called 'free,' which exists solely by the necessity of its
own nature, and of which the action is determined by itself alone. On
the other hand, that thing is necessary, or rather constrained, which is
determined by something external to itself to a fixed and definite
method of existence or action.
VIII. By 'eternity' I mean existence itself, in so far as it is conceived
necessarily to follow solely from the definition of that which is eternal.
>>>>>Explanation--Existence of this kind is conceived as an eternal
truth, like the essence of a thing and, therefore, cannot be explained by
means of continuance or time, though continuance may be conceived
without a beginning or end.
AXIOMS. I. Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in
something else.
II. That which cannot be conceived through anything else must be
conceived through itself.
III. From a given definite cause an effect necessarily follows; and, on
the other hand, if no definite cause be granted, it is impossible that an

effect can follow.
IV. The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the knowledge
of a cause.
V. Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, the
one by means of the other; the conception of one does not involve the
conception of the other.
VI. A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object.
VII. If a thing can be conceived as non-existing, its essence does not
involve existence.
PROPOSITIONS. I. Substance is by nature prior to its modifications.
>>>>>Proof--This is clear from Deff. iii. and v.
II. Two substances, whose attributes are different, have nothing in
common.
>>>>>Proof--Also evident from Def. iii. For each must exist in itself,
and be conceived through itself; in other words, the conception of one
does not imply the conception of the other.
III. Things which have nothing in common cannot be one the cause of
the other.
>>>>>Proof--If they have nothing in common, it follows that one
cannot be apprehended by means of the other (Ax. v.), and, therefore,
one cannot be the cause of the other (Ax. iv.). Q.E.D.
IV. Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from the other,
either by the difference of the attributes of the substances, or by the
difference of their modifications.
>>>>>Proof--Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in
something else (Ax. i.),-- that is (by Deff. iii. and v.), nothing is granted
in addition to the understanding, except substance and its modifications.
Nothing is, therefore,