Essays on Education and Kindred Subjects | Page 8

are committed to memory, not because of any direct benefits that can
possibly result from knowing them: but because society considers them
parts of a good education--because the absence of such knowledge may
bring the contempt of others. When we have named reading, writing,
spelling, grammar, arithmetic, and sewing, we have named about all the
things a girl is taught with a view to their actual uses in life; and even
some of these have more reference to the good opinion of others than to
immediate personal welfare.
Thoroughly to realise the truth that with the mind as with the body the
ornamental precedes the useful, it is requisite to glance at its rationale.
This lies in the fact that, from the far past down even to the present,
social needs have subordinated individual needs, and that the chief
social need has been the control of individuals. It is not, as we
commonly suppose, that there are no governments but those of
monarchs, and parliaments, and constituted authorities. These
acknowledged governments are supplemented by other
unacknowledged ones, that grow up in all circles, in which every man
or woman strives to be king or queen or lesser dignitary. To get above
some and be reverenced by them, and to propitiate those who are above
us, is the universal struggle in which the chief energies of life are
expended. By the accumulation of wealth, by style of living, by beauty
of dress, by display of knowledge or intellect, each tries to subjugate
others; and so aids in weaving that ramified network of restraints by
which society is kept in order. It is not the savage chief only, who, in
formidable war-paint, with scalps at his belt, aims to strike awe into his
inferiors; it is not only the belle who, by elaborate toilet, polished

manners, and numerous accomplishments, strives to "make conquests;"
but the scholar, the historian, the philosopher, use their acquirements to
the same end. We are none of us content with quietly unfolding our
own individualities to the full in all directions; but have a restless
craving to impress our individualities upon others, and in some way
subordinate them. And this it is which determines the character of our
education. Not what knowledge is of most real worth, is the
consideration; but what will bring most applause, honour, respect--what
will most conduce to social position and influence--what will be most
imposing. As, throughout life, not what we are, but what we shall be
thought, is the question; so in education, the question is, not the
intrinsic value of knowledge, so much as its extrinsic effects on others.
And this being our dominant idea, direct utility is scarcely more
regarded than by the barbarian when filing his teeth and staining his
nails.
* * * * *
If there requires further evidence of the rude, undeveloped character of
our education, we have it in the fact that the comparative worths of
different kinds of knowledge have been as yet scarcely even
discussed--much less discussed in a methodic way with definite results.
Not only is it that no standard of relative values has yet been agreed
upon; but the existence of any such standard has not been conceived in
a clear manner. And not only is it that the existence of such a standard
has not been clearly conceived; but the need for it seems to have been
scarcely even felt. Men read books on this topic, and attend lectures on
that; decide that their children shall be instructed in these branches of
knowledge, and shall not be instructed in those; and all under the
guidance of mere custom, or liking, or prejudice; without ever
considering the enormous importance of determining in some rational
way what things are really most worth learning. It is true that in all
circles we hear occasional remarks on the importance of this or the
other order of information. But whether the degree of its importance
justifies the expenditure of the time needed to acquire it; and whether
there are not things of more importance to which such time might be
better devoted; are queries which, if raised at all, are disposed of quite

summarily, according to personal predilections. It is true also, that now
and then, we hear revived the standing controversy respecting the
comparative merits of classics and mathematics. This controversy,
however, is carried on in an empirical manner, with no reference to an
ascertained criterion; and the question at issue is insignificant when
compared with the general question of which it is part. To suppose that
deciding whether a mathematical or a classical education is the best is
deciding what is the proper curriculum, is much the same thing as to
suppose that the whole of dietetics lies in ascertaining whether or not
bread is