Essays in Liberalism | Page 6

on a footing absolutely equal with other nationals of the country
in which they live. If that could be established, one of the great
difficulties in the way of international co-operation in the spirit of
peace will be removed.
THE MISTAKE OF VERSAILLES
These are the two aspects I wanted to bring before you. If we are to get
down to the root of the matter; if we are to uproot the old jungle theory
of international relations, we must recognise that the chief danger and
difficulty before us is what may be described as excessive nationalism.
We have to recognise in this and other countries that a mere belief in
narrow national interests will never really take you anywhere. You
must recognise that humanity can only exist and prosper as a whole,
and that you cannot separate the nation in which you live, and say you
will work for its prosperity and welfare alone, without considering that
its prosperity and welfare depend on that of others. And the differences
on that point go right through a great deal of the political thought of the
day.
Take the question of reparations. I am not going to discuss in detail
what ought to be done in that difficult and vexed question, but I want to

call your attention to the mistake which was originally made, and
which we have never yet been able to retrieve. The fundamental error
of Versailles was the failure to recognise that even in dealing with a
conquered enemy you can only successfully proceed by co-operation.
That was the mistake--the idea that the victorious Powers could impose
their will without regard to the feelings and desires and national
sentiment of their enemy, even though he was beaten. For the first time
in the history of peace conferences, the vanquished Power was not
allowed to take part in any real discussion of the terms of the treaty.
The attitude adopted was, "These are our terms, take or leave them, but
you will get nothing else." No attempt was made to appreciate, or even
investigate the view put forward by the Germans on that occasion. And
last, but not least, they were most unfortunately excluded from
membership of the League at that time. I felt profoundly indignant with
the Germans and their conduct of the war. I still believe it was due
almost exclusively to the German policy and the policy of their rulers
that the war took place, and that it was reasonable and right to feel
profound indignation, and to desire that international misdeeds of that
character should be adequately punished. But what was wrong was to
think that you could as a matter of practice or of international ethics try
to impose by main force a series of provisions without regard to the
consent or dissent of the country on which you were trying to impose
them. That is part of the heresy that force counts for everything. I wish
some learned person in Oxford or elsewhere would write an essay to
show how little force has been able to achieve in the world. And the
curious and the really remarkable thing is that it was this heresy which
brought Germany herself to grief. It is because of the false and immoral
belief in the all-powerfulness of force that Germany has fallen, and yet
those opposed to Germany, though they conquered her, adopted only
too much of her moral code.
It was because the Allies really adopted the doctrine of the mailed fist
that we are now suffering from the terrible economic difficulties and
dangers which surround us. I venture to insist on that now, because
there are a large number of people who have not abandoned that view.
There are still a number of people who think the real failure that has
been committed is not that we went wrong, as I think, in our

negotiations at Versailles, but that we have not exerted enough force,
and that the remedy for the present situation is more threats of force. I
am sure it won't answer. I want to say that that doctrine is just as
pernicious when applied to France as when applied to Germany. You
have made an agreement. You have signed and ratified a treaty; you are
internationally bound by that treaty. It is no use turning round and with
a new incarnation of the policy of the mailed fist threatening one of
your co-signatories that they are bound to abandon the rights which you
wrongly and foolishly gave to them under that treaty.
I am against a policy based on force as applied to Germany. I am
equally opposed to a policy based on force as applied to France. If we
really understand the creed for which we stand, we must aim at
co-operation