Essay on the Trial By Jury | Page 7

by its
own authority, punish disobedience, can compel obedience and
submission, and is above all responsibility for the character of its laws.
In short, it is a despotism.
And it is of no consequence to inquire how a government came by this
power to punish, whether by prescription, by inheritance, by usurpation.
or by delegation from the people's If it have now but got it, the
government is absolute.
It is plain, therefore, that if the people have invested the government
with power to make laws that absolutely bind the people, and to punish
the people for transgressing those laws, the people have surrendered
their liberties unreservedly into the hands of the government.
It is of no avail to say, in answer to this view of the ease, that in
surrendering their liberties into the hands of the government, the people
took an oath from the government, that it would exercise its power
within certain constitutional limits; for when did oaths ever restrain a
government that was otherwise unrestrained? Orwhen did a
government fail to determine that all its acts were within the
constitutional and authorized limits of its power, if it were permitted to
determine that question for itself?
Neither is it of any avail to say, that, if the government abuse its power,
and enact unjust and oppressive laws, the government may be changed
by the influence of discussion, and the exercise of the right of suffrage.
Discussion can do nothing to prevent the enactment, or procure the
repeal, of unjust laws, unless it be understood that, the discussion is to
be followed by resistance. Tyrants care nothing for discussions that are
to end only in discussion. Discussions, which do not interfere with the
enforcement of their laws, are but idle wind to them. Suffrage is

equally powerless and unreliable. It can be exercised only periodically;
and the tyranny must at least be borne until the time for suffrage comes.
Be sides, when the suffrage is exercised, it gives no guaranty for the
repeal of existing laws that are oppressive, and no security against the
enactment of new ones that are equally so. The second body of
legislators are liable and likely to be just as tyrannical as the first. If it
be said that the second body may be chosen for their integrity, the
answer is, that the first were chosen for that very reason, and yet proved
tyrants. The second will be exposed to the same temptations as the first,
and will be just as likely to prove tyrannical. Who ever heard that
succeeding legislatures were, on the whole, more honest than those that
preceded them? What is there in the nature of men or things to make
them so? If it be said that the first body were chosen from motives of
injustice, that fact proves that there is a portion of society who desire to
establish injustice; and if they were powerful or artful enough to
procure the election of their instruments to compose the first legislature,
they will be likely to be powerful or artful enough to procure the
election of the same or similar instruments to compose the second. The
right of suffrage, therefore, and even a change of legislators, guarantees
no change of legislation certainly no change for the better. Even if a
change for the better actually comes, t cmes too late, because it comes
only after more or less injustice has been irreparably done.
But, at best, the right of suffrage can be exercised only periodically;
and between the periods the legislators are wholly irresponsible. No
despot was ever more entirely irresponsible than are republican
legislators during the period for which they are chosen. They can
neither, be removed from their office, nor called to account while in
their office, nor punished after they leave their office, be their tyranny
what it may. Moreover, the judicial and executive departments of the
government are equally irresponsible to the people, and are only
responsible, (by impeachment, and dependence for their salaries), to
these irresponsible legislators. This dependence of the judiciary and
executive upon the legislature is a guaranty that they will always
sanction and execute its laws, whether just or unjust. Thus the
legislators hold the whole power of the government in their hands, and
are at the same time utterly irresponsible for the manner in which they

use it.
If, now, this government, (the three branches thus really united in one),
can determine the validity of, and enforce, its own laws, it is, for the
time being, entirely absolute, and wholly irresponsible to the people.
But this is not all. These legislators, and this government, so
irresponsible while in power, can perpetuate their power at pleasure, if
they can determine what legislation is authoritative upon the people,
and can enforce obedience to