Eryxias | Page 7

that the intemperate man
should refrain from meat and drink and other pleasant things, but he
cannot owing to his intemperance, will it not also be better that he
should be too poor to gratify his lust rather than that he should have a
superabundance of means? For thus he will not be able to sin, although
he desire never so much.
Critias appeared to be arguing so admirably that Eryxias, if he had not
been ashamed of the bystanders, would probably have got up and
struck him. For he thought that he had been robbed of a great
possession when it became obvious to him that he had been wrong in
his former opinion about wealth. I observed his vexation, and feared
that they would proceed to abuse and quarrelling: so I said,--I heard
that very argument used in the Lyceum yesterday by a wise man,
Prodicus of Ceos; but the audience thought that he was talking mere
nonsense, and no one could be persuaded that he was speaking the truth.
And when at last a certain talkative young gentleman came in, and,
taking his seat, began to laugh and jeer at Prodicus, tormenting him and
demanding an explanation of his argument, he gained the ear of the
audience far more than Prodicus.
Can you repeat the discourse to us? Said Erasistratus.
SOCRATES: If I can only remember it, I will. The youth began by

asking Prodicus, In what way did he think that riches were a good and
in what an evil? Prodicus answered, as you did just now, that they were
a good to good men and to those who knew in what way they should be
employed, while to the bad and the ignorant they were an evil. The
same is true, he went on to say, of all other things; men make them to
be what they are themselves. The saying of Archilochus is true:--
'Men's thoughts correspond to the things which they meet with.'
Well, then, replied the youth, if any one makes me wise in that wisdom
whereby good men become wise, he must also make everything else
good to me. Not that he concerns himself at all with these other things,
but he has converted my ignorance into wisdom. If, for example, a
person teach me grammar or music, he will at the same time teach me
all that relates to grammar or music, and so when he makes me good,
he makes things good to me.
Prodicus did not altogether agree: still he consented to what was said.
And do you think, said the youth, that doing good things is like
building a house,--the work of human agency; or do things remain what
they were at first, good or bad, for all time?
Prodicus began to suspect, I fancy, the direction which the argument
was likely to take, and did not wish to be put down by a mere stripling
before all those present:--(if they two had been alone, he would not
have minded):--so he answered, cleverly enough: I think that doing
good things is a work of human agency.
And is virtue in your opinion, Prodicus, innate or acquired by
instruction?
The latter, said Prodicus.
Then you would consider him a simpleton who supposed that he could
obtain by praying to the Gods the knowledge of grammar or music or
any other art, which he must either learn from another or find out for
himself?
Prodicus agreed to this also.
And when you pray to the Gods that you may do well and receive good,
you mean by your prayer nothing else than that you desire to become
good and wise:--if, at least, things are good to the good and wise and
evil to the evil. But in that case, if virtue is acquired by instruction, it
would appear that you only pray to be taught what you do not know.
Hereupon I said to Prodicus that it was no misfortune to him if he had

been proved to be in error in supposing that the Gods immediately
granted to us whatever we asked:--if, I added, whenever you go up to
the Acropolis you earnestly entreat the Gods to grant you good things,
although you know not whether they can yield your request, it is as
though you went to the doors of the grammarian and begged him,
although you had never made a study of the art, to give you a
knowledge of grammar which would enable you forthwith to do the
business of a grammarian.
While I was speaking, Prodicus was preparing to retaliate upon his
youthful assailant, intending to employ the argument of which you
have just made use; for he was annoyed to have it supposed that he
offered a vain prayer to the Gods. But the master