Dream Psychology | Page 7

the psychical process which has transformed
the latent content of the dream into its manifest content? (2) What is the motive or the
motives which have made such transformation exigent? The process by which the change
from latent to manifest content is executed I name the _dream-work_. In contrast with
this is the work of analysis, which produces the reverse transformation. The other
problems of the dream--the inquiry as to its stimuli, as to the source of its materials, as to
its possible purpose, the function of dreaming, the forgetting of dreams--these I will
discuss in connection with the latent dream-content.
I shall take every care to avoid a confusion between the manifest and the latent content,
for I ascribe all the contradictory as well as the incorrect accounts of dream-life to the
ignorance of this latent content, now first laid bare through analysis.
The conversion of the latent dream thoughts into those manifest deserves our close study
as the first known example of the transformation of psychical stuff from one mode of
expression into another. From a mode of expression which, moreover, is readily

intelligible into another which we can only penetrate by effort and with guidance,
although this new mode must be equally reckoned as an effort of our own psychical
activity. From the standpoint of the relationship of latent to manifest dream-content,
dreams can be divided into three classes. We can, in the first place, distinguish those
dreams which have a meaning and are, at the same time, intelligible, which allow us to
penetrate into our psychical life without further ado. Such dreams are numerous; they are
usually short, and, as a general rule, do not seem very noticeable, because everything
remarkable or exciting surprise is absent. Their occurrence is, moreover, a strong
argument against the doctrine which derives the dream from the isolated activity of
certain cortical elements. All signs of a lowered or subdivided psychical activity are
wanting. Yet we never raise any objection to characterizing them as dreams, nor do we
confound them with the products of our waking life.
A second group is formed by those dreams which are indeed self-coherent and have a
distinct meaning, but appear strange because we are unable to reconcile their meaning
with our mental life. That is the case when we dream, for instance, that some dear relative
has died of plague when we know of no ground for expecting, apprehending, or assuming
anything of the sort; we can only ask ourself wonderingly: "What brought that into my
head?" To the third group those dreams belong which are void of both meaning and
intelligibility; they are _incoherent, complicated, and meaningless_. The overwhelming
number of our dreams partake of this character, and this has given rise to the
contemptuous attitude towards dreams and the medical theory of their limited psychical
activity. It is especially in the longer and more complicated dream-plots that signs of
incoherence are seldom missing.
The contrast between manifest and latent dream-content is clearly only of value for the
dreams of the second and more especially for those of the third class. Here are problems
which are only solved when the manifest dream is replaced by its latent content; it was an
example of this kind, a complicated and unintelligible dream, that we subjected to
analysis. Against our expectation we, however, struck upon reasons which prevented a
complete cognizance of the latent dream thought. On the repetition of this same
experience we were forced to the supposition that there is an _intimate bond, with laws of
its own, between the unintelligible and complicated nature of the dream and the
difficulties attending communication of the thoughts connected with the dream_. Before
investigating the nature of this bond, it will be advantageous to turn our attention to the
more readily intelligible dreams of the first class where, the manifest and latent content
being identical, the dream work seems to be omitted.
The investigation of these dreams is also advisable from another standpoint. The dreams
of children are of this nature; they have a meaning, and are not bizarre. This, by the way,
is a further objection to reducing dreams to a dissociation of cerebral activity in sleep, for
why should such a lowering of psychical functions belong to the nature of sleep in adults,
but not in children? We are, however, fully justified in expecting that the explanation of
psychical processes in children, essentially simplified as they may be, should serve as an
indispensable preparation towards the psychology of the adult.
I shall therefore cite some examples of dreams which I have gathered from children. A

girl of nineteen months was made to go without food for a day because she had been sick
in the morning, and, according to nurse, had made herself ill through eating strawberries.
During