Discourse on the Method of Reasoning | Page 8

And although my own satisfaction with my work has
led me to present here a draft of it, I do not by any means therefore
recommend to every one else to make a similar attempt. Those whom
God has endowed with a larger measure of genius will entertain,
perhaps, designs still more exalted; but for the many I am much afraid
lest even the present undertaking be more than they can safely venture
to imitate. The single design to strip one's self of all past beliefs is one
that ought not to be taken by every one. The majority of men is
composed of two classes, for neither of which would this be at all a
befitting resolution: in the first place, of those who with more than a
due confidence in their own powers, are precipitate in their judgments
and want the patience requisite for orderly and circumspect thinking;
whence it happens, that if men of this class once take the liberty to
doubt of their accustomed opinions, and quit the beaten highway, they
will never be able to thread the byway that would lead them by a
shorter course, and will lose themselves and continue to wander for life;
in the second place, of those who, possessed of sufficient sense or
modesty to determine that there are others who excel them in the power
of discriminating between truth and error, and by whom they may be
instructed, ought rather to content themselves with the opinions of such
than trust for more correct to their own reason.
For my own part, I should doubtless have belonged to the latter class,
had I received instruction from but one master, or had I never known
the diversities of opinion that from time immemorial have prevailed
among men of the greatest learning. But I had become aware, even so
early as during my college life, that no opinion, however absurd and
incredible, can be imagined, which has not been maintained by some
on of the philosophers; and afterwards in the course of my travels I
remarked that all those whose opinions are decidedly repugnant to ours
are not in that account barbarians and savages, but on the contrary that

many of these nations make an equally good, if not better, use of their
reason than we do. I took into account also the very different character
which a person brought up from infancy in France or Germany exhibits,
from that which, with the same mind originally, this individual would
have possessed had he lived always among the Chinese or with savages,
and the circumstance that in dress itself the fashion which pleased us
ten years ago, and which may again, perhaps, be received into favor
before ten years have gone, appears to us at this moment extravagant
and ridiculous. I was thus led to infer that the ground of our opinions is
far more custom and example than any certain knowledge. And, finally,
although such be the ground of our opinions, I remarked that a plurality
of suffrages is no guarantee of truth where it is at all of difficult
discovery, as in such cases it is much more likely that it will be found
by one than by many. I could, however, select from the crowd no one
whose opinions seemed worthy of preference, and thus I found myself
constrained, as it were, to use my own reason in the conduct of my life.
But like one walking alone and in the dark, I resolved to proceed so
slowly and with such circumspection, that if I did not advance far, I
would at least guard against falling. I did not even choose to dismiss
summarily any of the opinions that had crept into my belief without
having been introduced by reason, but first of all took sufficient time
carefully to satisfy myself of the general nature of the task I was setting
myself, and ascertain the true method by which to arrive at the
knowledge of whatever lay within the compass of my powers.
Among the branches of philosophy, I had, at an earlier period, given
some attention to logic, and among those of the mathematics to
geometrical analysis and algebra, -- three arts or sciences which ought,
as I conceived, to contribute something to my design. But, on
examination, I found that, as for logic, its syllogisms and the majority
of its other precepts are of avail- rather in the communication of what
we already know, or even as the art of Lully, in speaking without
judgment of things of which we are ignorant, than in the investigation
of the unknown; and although this science contains indeed a number of
correct and very excellent precepts, there are, nevertheless, so many
others, and these either injurious or superfluous, mingled with the

former, that