Direct Legislation by the Citizenship through the Initiative and Referendum | Page 3

government. In a democracy, the citizens themselves make the law and

superintend its administration; in a representative government, the
citizens empower legislators and executive officers to make the law and
to carry it out. Under a democracy, sovereignty remains uninterruptedly
with the citizens, or rather a changing majority of the citizens; under a
representative government, sovereignty is surrendered by the citizens,
for stated terms, to officials. In other words, democracy is direct rule by
the majority, while representative government is rule by a succession of
quasi-oligarchies, indirectly and remotely responsible to the majority.
Observe, now, first, the influences that chiefly contribute to make
government in the United States what it is:--
The county, state, and federal governments are not democracies. In
form, they are quasi-oligarchies composed of representatives and
executives; but in fact they are frequently complete oligarchies,
composed in part of unending rings of politicians that directly control
the law and the offices, and in part of the permanent plutocracy, who
purchase legislation through the politicians.
Observe, next, certain strong influences for the better that obtain in a
pure democracy:--
An obvious influence is, in one respect, the same as that which enriches
the plutocrat and prompts the politician to reach for power--self-interest.
When all the members of any body of men find themselves in equal
relation to a profitable end in which they solely are concerned, they will
surely be inclined to assert their joint independence of other bodies in
that respect, and, further, each member will claim his full share of
whatever benefits arise. But, more than that; something like equality of
benefits being achieved, perhaps through various agencies of force, a
second influence will be brought powerfully to bear on those concerned.
It is that of justice. Fair play to all the members will be generally
demanded.
In a pure democracy, therefore, intelligently controlled self-interest and
a consequent sentiment of justice are the sources in which the highest
possible social benefits may be expected to begin.

The reader has now before him the political principle to be here
maintained--pure democracy as distinguished from representative
government. My argument, then, becomes this: To show that, by means
of the one lawmaking method to which pure democracy is
restricted,--that of direct legislation by the citizenship,--the political
"ring," "boss," and "heeler" may be abolished, the American plutocracy
destroyed, and government simplified and reduced to the limits set by
the conscience of the majority as affected by social necessities. My task
involves proof that direct legislation is possible with large
communities.
Direct Legislation in Switzerland.
Evidence as to the practicability and the effects of direct legislation is
afforded by Switzerland, especially in its history during the past
twenty-five years. To this evidence I turn at once.
There are in Switzerland twenty-two cantons (states), which are
subdivided into 2,706 communes (townships). The commune is the
political as well as territorial unit. Commonly, as nearly as consistent
with cantonal and federal rights, in local affairs the commune governs
itself. Its citizens regard it as their smaller state. It is jealous of
interference by the greater state. It has its own property to look after.
Until the interests of the canton or the Confederation manifestly replace
those of the immediate locality, the commune declines to part with the
administration of its lands, forests, police, roads, schools, churches, or
taxes.
In German Switzerland the adult male inhabitants of the commune
meet at least once annually, usually in the town market place or on a
mountain plain, and carry out their functions as citizens. There they
debate proposed laws, name officers, and discuss affairs of a public
nature. On such occasions, every citizen is a legislator, his voice and
vote influencing the questions at issue. The right of initiating a measure
belongs to each. Decision is ordinarily made by show of hands. In most
cantons the youth becomes a voter at twenty, the legal age for acquiring
a vote in federal affairs, though the range for cantonal matters is from
eighteen to twenty-one.

Similar democratic legislative meetings govern two cantons as cantons
and two other cantons divided into demi-cantons. In the demi-canton of
Outer Appenzell, 13,500 voters are qualified thus to meet and legislate,
and the number actually assembled is sometimes 10,000. But this is the
highest extreme for such an assemblage--a Landsgemeinde (a
land-community)--the lowest for a canton or a demi-canton comprising
about 3,000. One other canton (Schwyz, 50,307 inhabitants) has
Landsgemeinde meetings, there being six, with an average of 2,000
voters to each. In communal political assemblages, however, there are
usually but a few hundred voters.
The yearly cantonal or demi-cantonal Landsgemeinde takes place on a
Sunday in April or May. While the powers and duties of the body vary
somewhat in different cantons, they usually cover the following
subjects: Partial as well as total revision of