Dios Rome, Vol. 4 | Page 3

our populace which
has lived during so many years in freedom, and difficult, since so many
enemies confront us round about, to reduce again to slavery the allies
and the subject nations, which from of old have been democratic
communities and were set free by our own selves.
[-6-] "To begin first with the smallest matter, it will be requisite that
you procure a large supply of money from all sides. It is impossible that
our present revenues should suffice for the very expenses, and
particularly for the support of the soldiers. This need exists also in
democracies, for it is not possible to organize any government without
expense. But under such a system many give largely in addition to what
is required, and do it frequently, making it a matter of rivalry and
securing proper honors for their liberality. Or, if perchance there are
compulsory levies upon everybody, they endure it because they can
persuade themselves that it is wise and because they are contributing in
their own behalf. Under sovereignties they think that the ruling power
alone, to which they credit boundless wealth, should bear the expense:
they are very ready to search out the ruler's sources of income, but do
not make a similar careful calculation about the outgo. They are not
inclined to pay out anything extra personally and of their own free will,

nor will they hear of voluntary public contributions. The former course
no one would choose, because he would not readily admit that he was
rich, and it is not to the advantage of the ruler to have it happen. So
liberal a citizen would immediately acquire a reputation for patriotism
among the mass of the people, would become conceited, and cause a
disturbance in politics. On the other hand, a general levy weighs
heavily upon them all and chiefly because they endure the loss whereas
others take the gain. In democracies those who contribute money as a
general rule also serve in the army, so that in a way they get it back
again. But in monarchies one set of people usually farm, manufacture,
carry on maritime enterprises, engage in politics,--the principal pursuits
by which fortunes are secured,--and a different set are under arms and
draw pay.
"This single necessity, then, which is of such importance [-7-] will
cause you trouble. Here is another. It is by all means essential that
whoever from time to time commits a crime should pay some penalty.
The majority of men are not brought to reason by suggestion or by
example, but it is absolutely requisite to punish them by
disenfranchisement, by exile, and by death; and this often happens in so
great an empire and in so large a multitude of men, especially during a
change of government. Now if you appointed other men to judge these
wrongdoers, they would acquit them speedily, particularly all whom
you may be thought to hate. For judges secure a pretended authority
when they act in any way contrary to the wish of the ruling power. If,
again, any are convicted, they will believe they have been condemned
on account of instructions for which you are responsible. However, if
you sit as judge yourself, you will be compelled to chastise many of the
peers,--and this is not favorable,--and you will certainly be thought to
be setting some of them right in anger rather than in justice. No one
believes that those who have the power to use compulsion can execute
judgment with justice, but everybody thinks that out of shame they
spread out a mere phantom and rough picture of government in front of
the truth, in order that under the legitimate name of court they may
fulfill their desire. This is what happens in monarchies. In democracies,
when any one is accused of committing a private wrong, he is made
defendant in a private suit before judges who are his equals: or, if he is
accused for a public crime, such a man has empaneled a jury of his

peers, whoever the lot shall designate. It is easier for men to bear their
decisions, since they do not think that any verdict rendered is due to the
power of the judge or has been wrung from him as a favor.[1]
[-8-] "Then again there are many, apart from any criminals, some
priding themselves on birth, others on wealth, others on something
different, in general not bad men, who are by nature opposed to the
conception of monarchy. If a ruler allows them to become strong, he
cannot live in safety, and if he undertakes to impose a check on them,
he cannot do so justly. What then shall he do with them? How shall he
treat them? If you root out their families, diminish their wealth, humble
their pride, you