Crito | Page 7

opinions, and the opinions of some men only, are to be valued,
and that other opinions, and the opinions of other men, are not to be
valued. I ask you whether I was right in maintaining this?
CRITO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: The good are to be regarded, and not the bad?
CRITO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And the opinions of the wise are good, and the opinions
of the unwise are evil?
CRITO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And what was said about another matter? Is the pupil
who devotes himself to the practice of gymnastics supposed to attend to
the praise and blame and opinion of every man, or of one man only--his
physician or trainer, whoever he may be?
CRITO: Of one man only.
SOCRATES: And he ought to fear the censure and welcome the praise
of that one only, and not of the many?
CRITO: Clearly so.
SOCRATES: And he ought to act and train, and eat and drink in the
way which seems good to his single master who has understanding,
rather than according to the opinion of all other men put together?
CRITO: True.
SOCRATES: And if he disobeys and disregards the opinion and
approval of the one, and regards the opinion of the many who have no
understanding, will he not suffer evil?
CRITO: Certainly he will.
SOCRATES: And what will the evil be, whither tending and what
affecting, in the disobedient person?
CRITO: Clearly, affecting the body; that is what is destroyed by the
evil.
SOCRATES: Very good; and is not this true, Crito, of other things
which we need not separately enumerate? In questions of just and
unjust, fair and foul, good and evil, which are the subjects of our
present consultation, ought we to follow the opinion of the many and to
fear them; or the opinion of the one man who has understanding? ought

we not to fear and reverence him more than all the rest of the world:
and if we desert him shall we not destroy and injure that principle in us
which may be assumed to be improved by justice and deteriorated by
injustice;--there is such a principle?
CRITO: Certainly there is, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Take a parallel instance:--if, acting under the advice of
those who have no understanding, we destroy that which is improved
by health and is deteriorated by disease, would life be worth having?
And that which has been destroyed is--the body?
CRITO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Could we live, having an evil and corrupted body?
CRITO: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: And will life be worth having, if that higher part of man
be destroyed, which is improved by justice and depraved by injustice?
Do we suppose that principle, whatever it may be in man, which has to
do with justice and injustice, to be inferior to the body?
CRITO: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: More honourable than the body?
CRITO: Far more.
SOCRATES: Then, my friend, we must not regard what the many say
of us: but what he, the one man who has understanding of just and
unjust, will say, and what the truth will say. And therefore you begin in
error when you advise that we should regard the opinion of the many
about just and unjust, good and evil, honorable and
dishonorable.--'Well,' some one will say, 'but the many can kill us.'
CRITO: Yes, Socrates; that will clearly be the answer.
SOCRATES: And it is true; but still I find with surprise that the old
argument is unshaken as ever. And I should like to know whether I may
say the same of another proposition--that not life, but a good life, is to
be chiefly valued?
CRITO: Yes, that also remains unshaken.
SOCRATES: And a good life is equivalent to a just and honorable
one--that holds also?
CRITO: Yes, it does.
SOCRATES: From these premisses I proceed to argue the question
whether I ought or ought not to try and escape without the consent of
the Athenians: and if I am clearly right in escaping, then I will make

the attempt; but if not, I will abstain. The other considerations which
you mention, of money and loss of character and the duty of educating
one's children, are, I fear, only the doctrines of the multitude, who
would be as ready to restore people to life, if they were able, as they are
to put them to death--and with as little reason. But now, since the
argument has thus far prevailed, the only question which remains to be
considered is, whether we shall do rightly either in escaping or in
suffering others to aid in our escape and paying them in money and
thanks, or whether in reality we shall not do rightly; and if the latter,
then death or any other calamity which may ensue on my remaining
here must not be allowed to