Cratylus | Page 8

to by
the way; then he discovers a hive of wisdom in the philosophy of
Heracleitus;-- the doctrine of the flux is contained in the word ousia (=
osia the pushing principle), an anticipation of Anaxagoras is found in
psuche and selene. Again, he ridicules the arbitrary methods of pulling
out and putting in letters which were in vogue among the philologers of
his time; or slightly scoffs at contemporary religious beliefs. Lastly, he
is impatient of hearing from the half-converted Cratylus the doctrine
that falsehood can neither be spoken, nor uttered, nor addressed; a piece
of sophistry attributed to Gorgias, which reappears in the Sophist. And
he proceeds to demolish, with no less delight than he had set up, the
Heracleitean theory of language.
In the latter part of the dialogue Socrates becomes more serious, though
he does not lay aside but rather aggravates his banter of the
Heracleiteans, whom here, as in the Theaetetus, he delights to ridicule.
What was the origin of this enmity we can hardly determine:--was it
due to the natural dislike which may be supposed to exist between the
'patrons of the flux' and the 'friends of the ideas' (Soph.)? or is it to be
attributed to the indignation which Plato felt at having wasted his time
upon 'Cratylus and the doctrines of Heracleitus' in the days of his youth?
Socrates, touching on some of the characteristic difficulties of early
Greek philosophy, endeavours to show Cratylus that imitation may be
partial or imperfect, that a knowledge of things is higher than a
knowledge of names, and that there can be no knowledge if all things
are in a state of transition. But Cratylus, who does not easily apprehend

the argument from common sense, remains unconvinced, and on the
whole inclines to his former opinion. Some profound philosophical
remarks are scattered up and down, admitting of an application not only
to language but to knowledge generally; such as the assertion that
'consistency is no test of truth:' or again, 'If we are over-precise about
words, truth will say "too late" to us as to the belated traveller in
Aegina.'
The place of the dialogue in the series cannot be determined with
certainty. The style and subject, and the treatment of the character of
Socrates, have a close resemblance to the earlier dialogues, especially
to the Phaedrus and Euthydemus. The manner in which the ideas are
spoken of at the end of the dialogue, also indicates a comparatively
early date. The imaginative element is still in full vigour; the Socrates
of the Cratylus is the Socrates of the Apology and Symposium, not yet
Platonized; and he describes, as in the Theaetetus, the philosophy of
Heracleitus by 'unsavoury' similes--he cannot believe that the world is
like 'a leaky vessel,' or 'a man who has a running at the nose'; he
attributes the flux of the world to the swimming in some folks' heads.
On the other hand, the relation of thought to language is omitted here,
but is treated of in the Sophist. These grounds are not sufficient to
enable us to arrive at a precise conclusion. But we shall not be far
wrong in placing the Cratylus about the middle, or at any rate in the
first half, of the series.
Cratylus, the Heracleitean philosopher, and Hermogenes, the brother of
Callias, have been arguing about names; the former maintaining that
they are natural, the latter that they are conventional. Cratylus affirms
that his own is a true name, but will not allow that the name of
Hermogenes is equally true. Hermogenes asks Socrates to explain to
him what Cratylus means; or, far rather, he would like to know, What
Socrates himself thinks about the truth or correctness of names?
Socrates replies, that hard is knowledge, and the nature of names is a
considerable part of knowledge: he has never been to hear the
fifty-drachma course of Prodicus; and having only attended the
single-drachma course, he is not competent to give an opinion on such
matters. When Cratylus denies that Hermogenes is a true name, he

supposes him to mean that he is not a true son of Hermes, because he is
never in luck. But he would like to have an open council and to hear
both sides.
Hermogenes is of opinion that there is no principle in names; they may
be changed, as we change the names of slaves, whenever we please,
and the altered name is as good as the original one.
You mean to say, for instance, rejoins Socrates, that if I agree to call a
man a horse, then a man will be rightly called a horse by me, and a man
by the rest of the world? But, surely, there is in words a true and a false,
as there are true and