Considerations of a Representative Government | Page 5

the first and second conditions,
and, in some considerable measure, the third; their doctrine, thus
limited, is incontestable. Whatever they mean more than this appears to
me untenable. All that we are told about the necessity of an historical
basis for institutions, of their being in harmony with the national usages
and character, and the like, means either this, or nothing to the purpose.
There is a great quantity of mere sentimentality connected with these
and similar phrases, over and above the amount of rational meaning
contained in them. But, considered practically, these alleged requisites
of political institutions are merely so many facilities for realising the
three conditions. When an institution, or a set of institutions, has the
way prepared for it by the opinions, tastes, and habits of the people,
they are not only more easily induced to accept it, but will more easily
learn, and will be, from the beginning, better disposed, to do what is
required of them both for the preservation of the institutions, and for

bringing them into such action as enables them to produce their best
results. It would be a great mistake in any legislator not to shape his
measures so as to take advantage of such pre-existing habits and
feelings when available. On the other hand, it is an exaggeration to
elevate these mere aids and facilities into necessary conditions. People
are more easily induced to do, and do more easily, what they are
already used to; but people also learn to do things new to them.
Familiarity is a great help; but much dwelling on an idea will make it
familiar, even when strange at first. There are abundant instances in
which a whole people have been eager for untried things. The amount
of capacity which a people possess for doing new things, and adapting
themselves to new circumstances; is itself one of the elements of the
question. It is a quality in which different nations, and different stages
of civilization, differ much from one another. The capability of any
given people for fulfilling the conditions of a given form of
government can not be pronounced on by any sweeping rule.
Knowledge of the particular people, and general practical judgment and
sagacity, must be the guides.
There is also another consideration not to be lost sight of. A people
may be unprepared for good institutions; but to kindle a desire for them
is a necessary part of the preparation. To recommend and advocate a
particular institution or form of government, and set its advantages in
the strongest light, is one of the modes, often the only mode within
reach, of educating the mind of the nation not only for accepting or
claiming, but also for working, the institution. What means had Italian
patriots, during the last and present generation, of preparing the Italian
people for freedom in unity, but by inciting them to demand it? Those,
however, who undertake such a task, need to be duly impressed, not
solely with the benefits of the institution or polity which they
recommend, but also with the capacities, moral, intellectual, and active,
required for working it; that they may avoid, if possible, stirring up a
desire too much in advance of the capacity.
The result of what has been said is, that, within the limits set by the
three conditions so often adverted to, institutions and forms of
government are a matter of choice. To inquire into the best form of

government in the abstract (as it is called) is not a chimerical, but a
highly practical employment of scientific intellect; and to introduce
into any country the best institutions which, in the existing state of that
country, are capable of, in any tolerable degree, fulfilling the conditions,
is one of the most rational objects to which practical effort can address
itself. Every thing which can be said by way of disparaging the efficacy
of human will and purpose in matters of government might be said of it
in every other of its applications. In all things there are very strict limits
to human power. It can only act by wielding some one or more of the
forces of nature. Forces, therefore, that can be applied to the desired use
must exist; and will only act according to their own laws. We can not
make the river run backwards; but we do not therefore say that
watermills "are not made, but grow." In politics, as in mechanics, the
power which is to keep the engine going must be sought for outside the
machinery; and if it is not forthcoming, or is insufficient to surmount
the obstacles which may reasonably be expected, the contrivance will
fail. This is no peculiarity of the political art; and amounts only to
saying that it is subject to the same limitations